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Energy security has been for decades one of the most important issues for the world economy. Since 
the 1970s, the supply of energy has meant a sure basis for the economic development of a country, it 
does not matter whether the country was an exporter or an importer. This problem is paramount for 
those countries that must sustain a huge economy like China, but it is likewise important for those 
countries that based their export sector -and their economies- on an energy resource. Oil is the energy 
resources of this dissertation -and to be more precise, crude oil- that represents the first good exported 
by Kazakhstan, the second country analyzed in this work. What I analyze are the relations in the oil 
sector between these two countries in the period 2014-2018. This period is crucial for the history of 
China because represents the first five years of the Belt and Road Initiative and the moment during 
the Kazakh economy was tested by the fall of the oil prices and the action of the Chinese oil firm in 
its own oil assets. My research question is: in a situation of economic asymmetry between two 
countries trading energy resource -one with a strong developed economy and one with a weak national 
economy based on the export of natural resource- will the importer country with the stronger economy 
able to increase its power over the exporter country? The answer to this question is negative, because 
despite the economic asymmetry between two countries, if the exporting country bases its economy 
on the natural resource traded, an importing country will meet resistance from the exporting country 
and will not be able to increase its power over it. To verify this hypothesis, I will apply the Asymmetry 
Theory theorized by Brantley Womack. This theory has been used to analyze the relations between 
China and Vietnam, and this application to the relations between China and Kazakhstan represents a 
novelty. To each of the key concepts  -energy security, power, and multi-vector policy- is dedicated 








In this dissertation, I will explain the relationship between China and Kazakhstan in the oil 
sector between 2014 and 2018. I will apply as theoretical framework the Asymmetry Theory of 
Brantley Womack. There are many reasons why I decided to write this dissertation. The most 
important, was to study the role that the region, and in particular Kazakhstan, has got in the 
international politics, what the interests of the main powers are in the region, and how the five states 
of the region react to these attentions. In the decision of the topic for my dissertation, the influence 
of the book “The Great Chessboard” by Zbigniew Brzezinski was important, because I meant this 
work to be an analysis of a superpower’s influence -China- in a bordering region. But this old school 
approach -now I realize to be at least two centuries old- was soon put away in the study of how 
Kazakhstan manages its export of crude oil. In the application of the theory of Womack and the 
collection of the data that I am going to use, I have come to realize that the role of the single Central 
Asian states in the international relations of the region is important, even paramount in some cases to 
understand how the superpowers deal with the region and the states.1 As a matter of fact, one of the 
variables of my work is the “multi-vector policy”, a concept that many scholars have used since the 
independence of the Central Asian countries as conceptual paradigm to understand and explain the 
foreign policy of Kazakhstan.2 My research question is: in a situation of economic asymmetry 
between two countries trading energy resource -one with a strong developed economy and one with 
a weak national economy based on the export of natural resource- will the importer country with the 
stronger economy able to increase its power over the exporter country? The hypothesis of my 
dissertation is that despite the economic asymmetry between two countries, an importing country will 
meet resistance from the exporting country and will not be able to increase its power over it. My case 
 
1 This opinion has turned into the mainstream approach to study the region in the last two decades, but I was always 
skeptical about this position  
2 M. Kassen, ‘Understanding foreign policy strategy of Kazakhstan: a case study of the landlocked and transcontinental 
country’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 31, N. 3-4, pp. 314-343 
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study confirms this hypothesis: in the period between 2014 and 2018, the flow of crude oil between 
Kazakhstan and China reduced sensitively after a period in which the Chinese NOCs had invested 
millions of dollars in exploration projects and acquisition of shares of the most important Kazakh oil 
assets. The resistance from the Kazakh government to the investments of Chinese NOCs is 
represented by the fact that the Kazakh Government made approve some laws that reinforced its role 
in the local NOCs and that China has become one of the less important destinations for the export of 
Kazakh oil, overcome by European and other Asian destinations.   
There are two main contributions to the academic debate I give with this dissertation. The first 
one is to apply the Asymmetry Theory to a context in which China is strongly involved, different 
from the one in which the theory has been thought. The second is that the publications about the 
relations between Kazakhstan and China in the energy sector reached a peak between the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the 2000s and then slowly reduced. In the academic debate, there is a lack 
of works dealing with the Sino-Kazakh relations in the oil sector in the period analyzed in my 
dissertation. In the last six years, the main works about China and Central Asia have been focused 
mainly on the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the effects on the single Central 
Asian states3. The sources I have used are mainly secondary -especially for the parts about the 
historical background and the conceptualization of the analysis- but I have also used primary sources 
like data provided by the webpages of the Ministry of the National Economy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the United Nations. 
I have structured the dissertation in three chapters. All the chapters are also divided into sub-
topics. The first chapter explains the background of my dissertation both from a historical and a 
theoretical point of view. In the first case, I will introduce the relations between the two countries 
from the independence of Kazakhstan until nowadays, mainly focusing on the relations in the oil 
 
3 R. Satke and F. Galdini, ‘Entre Oriente y Occidente: Kazajistan y la nueva Ruta de la Seda de China’, Revisa CIDOB 
d’Afers Internacionals, N. 110, pp. 87-112 
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sector and the investment of China in some Kazakh oil companies. Those were part of the “going 
out” strategy, also explained in the chapter, to look for new sources of oil supply. To have a better 
understanding of the topic, I also consider how oil has become a strategic good for China starting 
from the economic situation of the country after the end of the Civil War in 1949. The following 
section of the chapter is dedicated to the theoretical background. The Asymmetry Theory belongs to 
the framework of the neo-Realist theories and it has been based on the relations between China and 
Vietnam. I will explain how it is applied to my cases and how it is related to other theoretical 
frameworks in International Relations academia. 
In the second chapter the focus will be on the analysis of the three variables: energy security 
-the independent variable-; power and its exercises -dependent variable-; and multi-vector policy -
intervening variable-. For all the variables, the approach in the analysis followed these steps: how it 
was born; how it has developed in the academic debates; what are the main features of the concept; 
and which ones are applicable to my case study. The variable that is analyzed the most is power: this 
concept, as you will see, has developed through the centuries and in many different fields: philosophy, 
sociology, political science, and international relations.  
In the third chapter, I will analyze the data that I have gathered. The data are taken from the 
UN Comtrade Dataset. This dataset is created by the UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs 
every year with the data received provided by every country about its own import and export flows. 
That makes this kind of data a primary source because are given directly by the countries themselves. 
The data are divided by goods and services, and every good is categorized according to its typology 
and characteristics. The data are available online. The main issue is that there is not a standardized 
way to count the trade flow but there are two ways to count the values of the good traded: some 
countries count the value of the trade until their borders without considering the actual the final 
destination and others count both the final destination and the arrival at the border. I decided to keep 
the statistical gap in the different ways to calculate the trade flow of both China and Kazakhstan in 
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order to maintain the different points of view in the relationship of the countries in the oil sector. For 
the economic statistics about the composition of the Kazakh GDP by sector, I used reports issued by 
the Ministry of the National Economy of Kazakhstan for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. All 
these reports are available online in English. The report for the year 2014 was only available in 
Russian and I decided not to use it because of my scarce knowledge of the Russian language and my 
lack of trust in the translation instruments provided by the Internet. Furthermore, the statistical data 
in Russian are composed differently from the English ones. I think that in this way I have applied in 
the best way possible the theoretical background because I respected one of the pillars of the theory 
of Womack: the different points of view of the countries involved in the relationship, that shape the 
relationship itself. This last chapter concludes with the explanation of why my hypothesis and the 
theory of Womack are proved and how.  
My approach is a comparative qualitative approach with the use of quantitative databases. I 
give the quantitative variations of both crude oil flow and crude oil value a scale according to the 
percentage variations of these indicators for Kazakhstan, China, and their partners. In the analysis of 
the trade, I have not considered all their partners: the two countries trade crude oil with more than 40 
countries on average every year, and with some of them the quantity and the economic value is so 
scarce that they do not influence the general trend of oil flow. So I will take just the most important 
importer and exporters, I will analyze to which continental framework they belong and the political 









Chapter 1   
 
Historical Background  
The relations between Kazakhstan and China are a new subject in the field of international 
relations and Asian politics. During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan was one of the15 republics of the 
union and became independent in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR. Kazakhstan is located in the 
middle of the Eurasian macro-continent and between two superpowers that have a longer statehood 
tradition: the Russian Federation and China. Russian Federation is the successor of the USSR and 
because of that keeps a privileged relationship with Nur-Sultan: Russians are the second biggest 
ethnic group in the country -even if the percentage on the overall population has decreased over the 
years and it is still decreasing-4; Christians Eastern Orthodox are the second biggest religious group5 
and Russian is the second language.  
Central Asia became an energy hub in the Soviet period. Resources like gas, oil, and water 
then were part of the same country and they were managed by a centralized system. In Central Asia, 
the exploitation of oilfields started during the 1920s, while in the Caucasus the first explorations of 
oilfields started at the beginning of the second half of the XIX century.6 During the 1960s, the oilfields 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus belonged to a system that started from the two regions and through 
the other Soviet republics ended in the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.7 In this network, 
Kazakhstan became specialized in the production of oil and gas. After the collapse of the USSR, the 
new independent states’ elites started thinking not regionally but nationally8 because the exploitation 
of natural resources was the fastest path to reach a stable economic development. The problem was 
 
4 S. Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), table 3.1, p. 55 
5 Too, K. ‘Religion in Kazakhstan’, (2019),  https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-beliefs-in-kazakhstan.html, 
consulted on 03/22/2020 
6 B. Janusz-Pawletta, The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea-Current Challenges and Prospect for Future Development, 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2015) 
7 A. Boute, Energy Security along the New Silk Road-energy law and geopolitics in Central Asia, (Cambridge, UK: 
University Printing House), pp. 23-24 
8 Boute, ibidem, p. 29 
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that the local regimes had to rely on the old network of pipelines. Pipelines that at the beginning of 
the new century were obsolete and not well-functioning, also because they were projected and built 
to transport oil to the Soviet center and in the new international framework the only country that could 
enjoy this situation was Russia.9 Because of these factors, international oil companies (IOCs) started 
penetrating the oil and gas market in the region.  
From the very first moment, the goal for the communist regime was to create a stable economy 
and many paths were taken to develop both the industry and agriculture. The former was the only 
sector that the regime was able to develop in the short term, but because of the communist ideology 
which the policies were based on, the economy showed the same pitfalls that USSR had during the 
1920s.10 The situation changed after the death of Mao and a new program of reforms implemented 
by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Since that year, China has always seen a positive annual GDP growth 
rate, that since 1990 has never been lower than 5%.11 In this framework, we have to consider that the 
industry always had a primary role in the economy and that China could count on the internal 
production of coal as the primary source of energy. At the beginning of the new century, coal was 
still the most important source of energy for industry, but its demand was so high that in 2015 China 
accounted for half of the global demand for coal.12 Oil has started sustaining the Chinese economic 
development since the mid-1980s, especially in the sector of transportation, and also because of this 
continuous demand during that decade that China became an importer state in 1993.13 It is clear that 
in that period the Chinese government became more interested in Central Asia. Oil made the two 
regions meet.  
 
9 Boute, ibidem, p. 37 
10 G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Storia Contemporanea-Il Novecento, (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2008), p. 301 
11 World Bank website, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2018&locations=CN&start=1961&view=chart, 
consulted on 03/23/2020  
12 R. Dannreuther, Energy Security, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017), p. 111 
13 G. Bridge, P. Le Billon, Oil, (Cambridge: Policy Press, 2017), p. 165  
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In the 1990s Central Asia countries entered the energy resources market and immediately it 
imposed as a major energy-producing region14, even if less important than the Middle East. That was 
an important change because the role of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
also diminished and National Oil Companies from China, India, and Europe had the chances to break 
the monopoly of OPEC and have a major role in new extractive projects. In this same period, China 
decided to reshape its energy governance by abolishing the Ministry of Energy and giving more 
freedom to its NOCs, which since then have enjoyed the rank of ministries along with the 
independence to pursue their profit goals.15 The three new Chinese NOCs that were the result of this 
reorganization were the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC); the China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec); and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC). The structure of the Chinese NOCs is peculiar: they are state-owned companies, but they 
enjoy a high level of autonomy in terms of investment strategy, that allows them to compete with 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) in the quest for resources16, that does not against the 
Government’s “going-out” strategy, that is the strategy adopted by the Chinese Government in 1997 
to secure oil and energy imports.17  This strategy can be defined as the diversified quest for oil in term 
of importing countries, investments made, and tools used to achieve the quota of oil missing in the 
annual consumption.18 According to some authors, this strategy is called “neomercantilism”.19 This 
approach is an evolution of the mercantilist approach typical of the European states between the 16th 
and the 19th century, and in the energy sector can be defined as a ‘strategic partnership between an 
importing state and an exporting state to lock in privilege access to oil via infrastructure and 
development deals and “equity oil” contracts which give the investing partner […] the right to take 
 
14Dannreuther, ibidem, p. 63  
15 T. S. Eder, China-Russia Relations in Central Asia-Energy Policy, Beijing’s New Assertiveness and 21st Century 
Geopolitics, (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014), p. 37 
16 Bridge and Le Billon, ibidem, p. 29  
17 Eder, ibidem, p. 38 
18 For more details see V. Vivoda, J. Manicom, ‘Oil Import Diversification in Northeast Asia: A Comparison Between 
China and Japan’, Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2011), pp. 223-254; and W. Chen, ‘China’s Oil 
Strategy: “Going Out” to Iran’, Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 2, No 1 (2010), pp. 39–54 
19 Dannreuther, ibidem, p. 69 
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or market oil’.20 Other authors have defined the Chinese approach as “statist multilateralism”, in 
which the aim of a state is to create capital by the reallocation of the surplus of capital coming from 
its borders.21 The investments of China in Kazakhstan were made easy by the aim of avoiding foreign 
domination and the strong influence.22 
 
The Chinese activities in the Kazakh oil sector  
The “loans-for-oil” deals that promise mainly industrial machinery in exchange for oil and 
gas are the most used tools by the Chinese NOCs in the “going-out” strategy.23 In some cases, the 
effects of these deals are political because China can supply arms or give international support to the 
exporting countries.24 The main form of these deals is the bilateral agreement between China and the 
exporter country with more than 20 years of duration. These kinds of agreements are not 
commercially advantageous for a country like China because the two sides of the agreement have the 
same contractual level and require too much commitment.25 But they are the only way to assure equity 
oil to China26 and the alternative would be to rely on the international market, but it has too many 
variables that threaten the supply of oil.27 As you will see in the next chapters, China has applied this 
pattern in all the continents.  
In Kazakhstan, the most visible effects deriving from the intervention of China on the local 
oil market are the building of a pipeline connecting the oil fields in the Northern Caspian to the 
 
20 Bridge and Le Billon, ibidem, p. 237  
21 M. P. Amineh, M. van Driel, ‘China’s statist energy relations with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan’, African and Asian 
Studies, Vol. 18 (2018), pp. 63-89 
22 Amineh and van Driel, ibidem, p. 74. For more details about the scandals in Kazakhstan involving Chinese NOCs see: 
A. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rulers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 138-142 and A. Cooley, J. 
Heathershaw, Dictators without borders-Power and money in Central Asia, (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2018), 
pp. 181-185 
23 Bridge and Le Billon, ibidem, p. 96 
24 Bridge and Le Billon, ibidem, p. 165 
25 Bridge and Le Billon, ibidem, p. 231  
26 Equity oil is a contractual regime that allows the oil companies operating in a country to sell abroad a limited part of 
the local oil production. For more detailed about equity oil direct application see H. Zhao, ‘China’s Oil Venture in 
Africa’, East Asia, Vol. 24, N. 4 (2007), pp. 399-415 
27 B. Shaffer, Energy Politics, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 87 
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Chinese border and the Chinese NOCs participation in extractive projects. In 1997 CNPC and 
KazMunayGas, a Kazakh state-owned company, announced the construction of the “Kazakhstan-
China Oil Pipeline”, project to be developed in three stages and that was completed in 2009, when it 
became operational.28 The pipeline is 2,228 km long and connects Atyrau, the terminal of the oil 
fields in the Northern Caspian Sea, to the city of Alashankou, in the Xinjiang autonomous region. 
According to many experts, this pipeline belongs to a Chinese-controlled energy network which 
includes the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, to break down the Russian control of the energy 
infrastructure in the region.29 The reason is very simple: with these new pipelines, the export of 
Central Asian energy resources is re-directed away from Moscow to Beijing.30 The importance of this 
pipeline for the trade of the two countries was so important that after one year the volume of oil 
exchange between the two countries increased from 25,592 barrels per day (bb/d) to 200,000 bb/d.31 
But the construction of this pipeline was not the only way China penetrated the Kazakh oil sector: 
Chines oil companies became active in extractive projects first in the biggest oilfields and then in the 
smallest ones and started purchasing shares of Kazakh oil companies. In 2005 when CNPC acquired 
the control of PetroKazakhstan, one of the biggest groups of oil companies in the country32, for 4,18 
billion $. Other following acquisitions were made in 2009 when CNPC acquired in a joint deal with 
KazMunayGas the oil producer “MangustauMunaiGaz” for 1,7 billion $ each one33; totally, by June 
2010, Chinese companies held between 50% and 100% stake in 15 Kazakh energy companies.34 After 
this expansion, the Kazakh Ministry of Energy made an explicit request to let the local company be 
among the shareholders.35 In those years Kazakhstan became for China the second foreign market for 
investment in the oil sector after Sudan with an important difference: to transport from Sudan requires 
 
28 Eder, ibidem, p. 38 
29 The Economist, 27 July 2019, p. 15, https://www.economist.com/asia/2013/09/14/rising-china-sinking-russia, 
consulted on 03/24/2020 
30 A. Cooley, J. Heathershaw, Dictators without borders-Power and money in Central Asia, (New Heaven: Yale 
University Press, 2018), p. 181 
31 A. Cooley, ‘Great Games, Local Rulers’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 92 
32 Cooley, ibidem, p. 91 
33 Amineh and van Driel, ibidem, p. 76  
34 Eder, ibidem, p. 53 
35 Amineh and van Driel, ibidem, p. 75  
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higher costs and it is riskier for the transit through the Gulf of Aden, a zone infested by pirates, and 
the Strait of Malacca, while the import from Kazakhstan was safer and quicker. 
 
Taking back the control  
But the expansion of the Chinese companies was not seen positively by the Kazakh 
government that aimed at keeping the control of some strategic assets. The pressure made the Ministry 
of the Energy was only one of the measures taken not to lose the national oil production, that was 
becoming one of the most important sources of revenues for Kazakh economy: from 1992 to 2013 
the production grew from 425,000 to 1,3 billion bbl./d, making the oil sector -and in particular the oil 
export- the most important economic pillars. As a consequence, the growth of the GDP started being 
positive from the second half of the 1990s, touching a +13.5% in 2001.36 It was clear that the 
penetration by the Chinese oil companies in this strategic sector that was aiming at giving the Chinese 
market the preference as destination. The point is that such a penetration was a big problem for the 
Kazakh government, which saw its main economic sector threatened by a foreign intervention. So, in 
2004 and 2005 the Law on Petroleum, the Subsoil and Subsoil Use Law, and the Law on Production 
Sharing Agreement were approved.37 These laws allowed the government to maintain control over 
the KazMunayGas company and the Kashagan oil project.38 KazMunayGas is the company that has 
enjoyed the most the political support from the government and the financial support from the 
National Bank and the Samruk-Kazyna Sovereign Wealth Fund. That made possible to gain control 
over the Kashagan oil project in the Northern Caspian, of which KazMunayGas holds 16.81%.39 
 
36 Amineh and van Driel, ibidem, p. 75; World Bank webiste, https://data.worldbank.org, consulted on 08/13/2020 
37 S. Orazgaliyev, ‘State intervention in Kazakhstan’s energy sector: Nationalization or participation?’, Journal of 
Eurasia, Vol. 9, (2018), p. 146 
38 Orazgaliyev, ibidem, pp 147-148. 
39 Orazgaliyev, ibidem, p. 148 
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The Kashagan oilfield is the largest oilfield in Kazakhstan and its terminal for the export to 
China is Atyrau. It was discovered in 2000 after the exploration of a consortium composed of foreign 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) like  Eni, BG, ExxonMobil, and Shell.40 When it was discovered, 
the previsions of Kashagan production was 1.2 million bb/d, and it was considered the biggest oilfield 
discovered in the last 30 years.41 The beginning of the production was postponed in 2013 due to 
technical problems and it started in 2016.42 Since then, it has been the main production asset of 
Kazakhstan along with two other oilfields: Tengiz and Karachaganak. The former is on the North-
East shores of Caspian while the latter in the West Kazakhstan Region, at the border with Russia. The 
control of these oilfields and the control of the state companies are the pillars of the Kazakhstan oil 
sector. The strengthening of these two pillars is moved by the attempt to counterbalance the 





 Analysts recognized that there are three main approaches in studying the concept of energy 
security and the energy relations between states: Realist approach, Liberal approach, and Marxist 
approach.44 Some authors add a fourth: the constructivist approach.45 The Realist approach is the 
 





RKFOLDER&ecomp=pfq9k&earg=sr2&prid=4f7d9286-977d-4a3b-af2b-ba424538a418, consulted on 03/26/2020 
41 The Economist, 11 October 2014, https://www.economist.com/business/2014/10/11/cash-all-gone, consulted on 
03/26/2020 
42 The Economist, ibidem, https://www.economist.com/business/2014/10/11/cash-all-gone, consulted on 03/26/2020 
43 Bridge and Le Billon, ibidem, p. 24; Orazgaliyev, ibidem, p. 146  
44 Dannreuther, ibidem, pp. 23-29 
45 T. van de Graaf, B.K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. Klare, ‘States, Markets, and Institutions: Integrating 
International Political Economy and Global Energy Politics’ in T. van de Graaf, B. K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. 
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oldest and considers natural resources, and among them energy, an instrument to strengthen the power 
position of a state in the international arena.46 Now the problem is that energy resources are not well 
distributed among states, so the race for the control becomes a geopolitical confrontation among 
superpowers to control the regions where energy resources are located.47 The Realist approach is also 
called “mercantilist” approach, and according to Klare, it justifies the “New Great Game” discourse 
about the Chinese involvement in Central Asia and in the Caspian Sea.48  
 According to the Liberal approach, energy is just one of the many tools that states have to 
develop the world economy. In Liberal theories, politics goes along with the economy, and the two 
are interconnected. If according to the Realist theories countries try to get all the resources for 
themselves to have more power and survive, for Liberal theorists energy is equally allocated among 
states through the market economy in which, private firms are free to act without the state 
intervention. Along with the states, the main actors are private firms, which contribute to share and 
distribute energy resources in the market.49  
The third approach is the Marxist approach, in which theorists sustain that economy is the 
pillar of the society and politics is just a consequence of the economic structure.50 The same scheme 
as the exploitation of the working class by the class owing the means of production -the capitalist 
class- is represented at the international level, with the richest countries, based on the capitalist 
economic model, exploiting poor resources-rich countries and gaining through the extraction and the 
selling of natural resources. Nowadays, this patter is represented in the relationships between 
 
Klare (ed), The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), p. 13  
46 T. van de Graaf, B.K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. Klare, in van de Graaf, Sovacool, Ghosh, and Klare, (ed) 
ibidem, p. 13 
47 Dannreuther, ibidem, p. 23 
48 Dannreuther, ibidem, p. 24  
49 T. van de Graaf, B.K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. Klare, in van de Graaf, Sovacool, Ghosh, and Klare, (ed), 
ibidem, p. 13 
50 T. van de Graaf, B.K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. Klare, in van de Graaf, Sovacool, Ghosh, and Klare, (ed), 
ibidem, p. 14  
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developed countries and their former colonies, especially in Africa -or in my case in Asia- because 
the latter do not have the skills and the means to develop the energy sector by themselves.  
 The last framework, the Constructivism framework, starts from the assumption that the role 
of energy in each society depends on its inherent values. So resources-rich countries do not have the 
same hunger for resources as resources-poor countries. The process through which a resource-poor 
country makes the quest of energy a priority is called “securitization”.51 “Securitization” is the 
“identification of an existential threat to a valued referent object and the call for exceptional 
measures”.52 For Constructivist theorists, the values, the norms, and the beliefs of a society are the 
basis of the ‘securitization’ process that brings to the definition of energy security, that it is recognized 
as a threat to the living of the society.  
For this dissertation, the background is the Asymmetry Theory coined by Brantly Womack. 
This theory has been thought by the author to explain the relationships between China and Vietnam, 
but I think that it is applicable also to my case because there are political and historic parallelisms 
between the Southern-eastern Asian country and the Central Asian republic. First of all, portions of 
the modern territories of Kazakhstan and Vietnam were part of the former Chinese Empire, and in 
these portions are located in both cases the most important cities: Almaty and Hanoi. The northern 
part of Vietnam became part of the Chinese Empire during the Han dynasty and remained part of the 
Chinese territory until the 10th century.53 In Kazakhstan, the region that belonged to China was the 
Eastern part (Almaty region and part of the Eastern Kazakhstan region).54 During the 1990s, some 
Chinese scholars started from the assumption that China was still territorially an empire to put the 
Eastern part of Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley -today divided among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
 
51 T. van de Graaf, B.K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. Klare, in van de Graaf, Sovacool, Ghosh, and Klare, (ed), 
ibidem, table 1.1, p. 16                                                                   
52 Buzan B., Wæver O., ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation 
Theory’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2009), pp. 253-276 
53 Enciclopedia, (Milano: Rizzoli Larousse, 2003) Vol. 22, p. 385  
54 ‘Finché America non ci separi’, Limes-Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, Vol. 11/2019, map n.2, p.14  
19 
 
and Tajikistan- inside the historical boundaries of the Chinese Empire.55 If we also compare some 
other data, we see other similarities: both Kazakhstan and Vietnam are smaller than China in terms 
of the population56, territorial extension57, economic volume58 and military capabilities. From a 
theoretical point of view, the author explains that the study of the relations between China and 
Vietnam gave him the chance to fill a gap typical of many other theories: the idea that smaller side in 
International Relations cannot influence the behavior of the great powers, those decisions creates 
effects in the global arena.59 If the other theories are focused on the superpower’s point of view, 
Womack focuses on the weaker countries’ point of view. Applied to energy security, this means that 
in the flow of energy resources between two countries with asymmetric capabilities, the stronger side 
cannot decide the mechanism of the relationship.  
These facts are important for the theory I will use because it considers the relationships 
between two countries based on the asymmetries in all these aspects. The former is country A which 
is bigger in terms of political and social capabilities, and in my case will be China. The smaller 
country is Kazakhstan, country B. The theory of asymmetry is so about how the disparity of capacities 
and power creates different feelings of perception and relative powers.60 
Asymmetry is defined as a situation of disparity stable and visible between the capabilities of 
two states, even though it is not overwhelming.61 In the case of Kazakhstan and China, the disparities 
 
55 A. Umraov and D. Pashkun, quoted in R. Muzalevsky, ‘China’s Rise and Reconfiguration of Central Asia’s Geopolitics: 
A case for U.S. “Pivot” to Eurasia’, Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia, Vol. 24, No. 2/3 
(2015), pp. 369-444  
56 In 2019 the Chinese population was 1,433,784,000 people, the Kazakh population was 18,551,000 people, and the 
Vietnamese population was 96,462,000 people, UN Data, http://data.un.org/en/index.html, consulted on 04/15/2020 
57 Territorial extension: China 9,600,000 km2; Kazakhstan 2,724,902 km2; Vietnam 330,967 km2. The data refer to 
2017. UN Data, ibidem 
58 According to the World Bank website the Kazakhstan GDP for 2018 was 179.34 billion US$; for Vietnam was 
245.214 billion US$; for China was 13.608 trillion US$. World Bank website,  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=KZ, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=VN, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN, consulted on 03/31/2020 
59 B. Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 1 
60 B. Womack, ‘Asymmetry theory and China’s concept of multipolarity’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 13, No. 
39 (2004), p. 359  
61Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 7  
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listed above are impossible to be overcome by Nur-Sultan because come from history and as we saw 
in the first paragraph the gap was already wide at the moment of independence of Kazakhstan. The 
relationship between the two countries is based on the roles that define the relationship itself. Country 
A’s role is different from country B’s role because of their capabilities and goals. Country A and 
country B then have different roles that they must respect each other. If they do so, the relationship 
will work.  So country A must recognize country B’s autonomy while country B must recognize the 
country A’s authority: in this case authority does not mean that country A has territorial claims over 
the country, but rather it is a recognition that the superiority of capabilities make it different from B 
in goals and means.62The relationship between them is bilateral and made up of two sub-relations, 
that follows this scheme A->B+A<-B= AB.63 The main point of this relationship is that the 
unilateral interests and identities of the two countries should not disturb the interactions among 
them.64 If taken from this perspective, the relationship must be managed in order to maintain a balance 
of the sides’ bargain power.65 The case study follows this pattern. It may be argued that there are 
some aspects actually reverse the positions of the two countries by giving China the role of country 
B and Kazakhstan the role of country A for the presence of big oilfields and the Chinese need for oil 
for the economy. But I do not think this is the case. China is still to be considered country A for the 
economic capabilities that allow the development of energy infrastructures which Kazakhstan misses 
to exploit its energy sector.  As we see, the relationship AB fully fits my case study.  
This theory is classifiable among the neo-Realist theories because the distribution of 
capabilities essentially means which country has more power. This theory represents one of the last 
evolutions inside the neo-Realist framework even if some details make it differ from the usual pattern. 
The author himself explains in which parts his theory evolves from some crucial concepts analyzed 
by the Realist tradition. The first concept to be differentiated is the concept of anarchy and the 
 
62 Womack, ‘Asymmetry theory and China’s concept of multipolarity’, p. 360  
63 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationship, p. 33 and p. 45.  
64 Womack, ‘China and Southeast Asia: Asymmetry, Leadership and Normalcy’, p. 539 
65 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, pp. 17-18  
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competition among nations, that, according to many Realist authors, stand at the basis of the 
International Relations.66 According to Womack, his theory does not deny the existence of the 
competition among nations, but, as the two corollaries of the theory explain, it is about the 
management of this competition and anarchy. The first corollary of the theory says that the smaller 
side (country B) “cannot put the larger side at mortal risk” while the second says that the larger side 
(country A) “ cannot eliminate the possibility of resistance by the smaller side”.67 In this way the only 
option the countries have, if they want to maintain their interests, is to try to bargain, in order to have 
a win-win situation within a situation of anarchy.68  
Another concept typical of the realism framework that it is partially adopted is the concept of 
power. This concept that will be analyzed in the next sections, has been discussed for a long time. 
Womack sustains that Realist theorists generally use an incorrect idea of power because it gives to 
many margins to the most powerful side to shape the relationship.69 What he wants to emphasize is 
that the Asymmetry Theory goes beyond this limitation by taking into account how internal 
capabilities -military or economic- of the weaker country can shape the relationship between country 
A and country B.70 When Womack makes clear that there are some aspects different from the pure 
power that influence the relationship, this idea is taken by some standpoints of the constructivism 
approach and the British School.71 As a matter of fact, the differences in capabilities and shape the 
perspective and then the social interactions that are at the base of the relationship between two 
countries; because of this Womack also defines Asymmetry Theory “Dialectical Realism”.72  
 
 
66 Here the concept of anarchy is taken by Hobbes, who defines it “the absence of an absolute ruler”, Womack, 
Asymmetry and International Relationship, footnote n. 21, p. 15 
67 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 16  
68 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 19 
69 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 29 
70 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 29  
71 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 27 
72 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 28 
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Literature review   
  The literature about energy security has become to rise in political sciences and international 
relations after the oil crisis in the 1970s. Nowadays the literature about energy resources is divided 
into the typology of resources (oil, natural gas, coal); the geopolitics of energy resources; and the 
conceptualization of energy security. “Energy Security” by Roland  Dannreuther and ‘The Palgrave 
Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy” edited by van de Graaf, Sovacool, 
Ghosh, Kern, and Klare belong to the last category. The first book gives an idea of energy security 
taking into account different dimensional approaches,73 while the latter puts in relation energy 
security and the international frameworks and actors like civil society, national and private 
companies, and states74 also from a historical perspective.  
The literature about the geopolitical implications touches every region in the world, but 
obviously, Asia has a privileged spot in this field for the presence of the most important producers in 
the world -in the Middle East- and for the growing economic weight that the continent will have in 
the next decades. About Central Asia, the literature has focused on the study of water as energy 
resources in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and on the study of gas and oil in Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan. The mechanisms regulating the politics and the economy of energy in Central 
Asia are analyzed by Anatole Boute in “Energy Security and the New Silk Road-energy law and 
Geopolitics in Central Asia” published in 2019. The book focuses on the energy legislation of the 
five republics and the reasons that made them fail.75 In the analysis, the factors taken into account are 
the influence of foreign companies, the inherent economic conditions, and political decisions taken 
by the local governments.76  
 
73 Dannreuther, ibidem 
74 T. van de Graaf, B.K. Sovacool, A. Ghosh, F. Kern, M.T. Klare, in van de Graaf, Sovacool, Ghosh, and Klare, (ed) 
ibidem, p. 15 
75 Boute, ibidem, p. 2  
76 Boute, ibidem, p. 5  
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The foreign influence in the Central Asian energy sector is well explained in the book ‘China-
Russia Relations in Central Asia-Energy Policy, Beijing’s New Assertiveness and 21st Century 
Politics’. The aim of the book is very simple: the author wants to explain the shift of power in Central 
Asia from Russia to China, and the energy security of the two countries -that among them maintain 
good relations in terms of energy trade- is used as a case study.77 The geopolitical relevance of the 
region -that can be considered by both the superpowers their geographical backyard- has been 
analyzed also by the Italian geopolitical magazine Limes. In the number dedicated to the relation 
between China and Russia, Kazakhstan is pictured as the pivot of the entire region for future 
cooperation and collaboration between Beijing and Moscow.78 According to the authors of this article, 
the geopolitical future of the region -and Kazakhstan- will depend on the role that political groups 
and ethnic clans will have after the Nazarbayev era, and the following collocation of the country in 
the global arena, that may award one superpower in respect of the others.79 The emphasis on the clan 
structure of Kazakhstan according to the consequences in international politics is an element of 
novelty in the analysis of the region. A more classical explanation of Kazakh foreign policy and 
position in international politics is given by Kassen, who explains Kazakh foreign policy as a 
consequence of its status of landlocked country.80 According to the author, both the status of 
landlocked and transcontinental country shape together Kazakh foreign policy. Usually, the literature 
focuses more on the second aspect.81 Kassen sustains that its status of landlocked creates many 
challenges to Kazakhstan, challenges that the country compensates by being also a transcontinental 
state.82 The empirical output in terms of political decisions is the multi-vector.83 
 
77 Eder, ibidem, pp. 13-14 
78 E. Novario and F. Vielmini, ‘Kazakistan-Il Perno dell’Asia Centrale’, Limes, Vol. 11/2019, p. 189 
79 Novario and Vilemini, ibidem, p, 199 
80 M. Kassen, ibidem, p. 315 
81 Kassen, ibidem, p. 318 
82 Kassen, ibidem, p. 323 
83 Kassen, ibidem, p. 323 
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The literature about China’s involvement in Central Asia and energy implications have 
already been studied for almost 30 years, especially after that China became a net exporter.  In the 
essay “Outcomes and strategies in the ‘New Great Game’: China and the Caspian states emerge as 
winners” by Smith and Kusznir and it is about how China has used its energy search as a political 
tool against other important superpowers.84 The authors compare the approaches of Russia, the 
European Union (EU), the United States, and China, and explain that the approach of Beijing has 
been the best to meet the expectation of the Central Asian countries that are also littoral countries in 
the Caspian Basin: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.85 The geopolitical implications of the Chinese 
involvement in Central Asia and specifically in the Kazakh oil sector were discussed by Skalamera, 
who has explained that the penetration in the Nur-Sultan’s oil sector is just a part of the strategy of 
the BRI and that the penetration has not been stopped by Russia for three main reasons: Moscow 
could not compete with the economic strength of Beijing; despite the investment, Russia remained 
the main partner for the Kazakh energy sector; last but not least, the chance that Russia and China 
would fight for the control of the energy sector not only in Kazakhstan but in Central Asia are low, 
since the focus of the Russian energy interests is moving toward the Arctic Sea.86 The essay ‘The 
overseas acquisitions and equity oil shares of Chinese national oil companies: A threat to the West 
but a boost to China’s energy security?” by ZhongXiang Zhang goes against the thesis of the essay 
written by Smith and Kusznir because assumes that China should rely more on the international oil 
market in order to assure for itself a higher level of energy security.87 So, the best way is not to 
politicize the investments abroad made by the Chinese NOCs. But at the same time, even the West 
should neither analyze nor consider the action of Chinese NOCs from a political point of view, 
because this may undermine the interaction between NOCs and IOCs in the oil market, making China 
 
84 K. Smith, J. Kusznir, ‘Outcomes and strategies in the ‘New Great Game’: China and the Caspian states emerge as 
winners’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, No. 6 (2015), pp. 91-106 
85 Smith and Kusznir, ibidem, pp. 101-106 
86 M, Skalamera, ‘The Silk Road between a Rock and a Hard Place: Russian and Chinese Competition for Central Asia’s 
Energy’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 20, M. 4 (Fall 2020), pp. 51-55  
87Z. Zhang, ‘The overseas acquisitions and equity oil shares of Chinese national oil companies: A threat to the West but 
a boost to China’s energy security?’, Energy Policy, Vol. 48 (2012), pp. 700-701 
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less keen in trusting in that.88 In the paper “China’s energy security: perception and realities”, the 
author gives a more comprehensive approach to the problem and starts to analyze it from a historical 
perspective: the first years of the communist regime -that we saw being the years in which China 
needed to take the first steps toward an industrial economy- shaped the current perception of the 
energy needs in China.89 This essay goes against the position expressed by Zhang in the previous 
paragraph: according to Leung, China does not have to rely on the international market and the 
stabilization of the prices, that is the ultimate market’s goal, because this undermines the current idea 
of energy security in China, that is the evolution of the one coming from the 1950s and the 1960s.90 
The proactive role of the Chinese public institutions in the investments in Kazakhstan was explained 
by Orazgaliyev, who explained how the roles of Kazakh and Chinese governments have changed in 
the last two decades in the development of the oil sector. The author’s position is that with the 
increasing of the competition for the Kazakh resources, the bargaining role of the Kazakh government 
has increased over the Chinese government, giving Nur-Sultan the margins to gain the most in this 
relationship.91  
The changes in Chinese foreign policy were well summarized by Ferdinand, who explains 
how the change of leadership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) corresponded to a new paradigm 
of China in international relations. Hu Jintao, who was succeeded by Xi Jinping in 2013 as secretary 
general of CCP, had a different approach in foreign policy, still influenced by the ages in which China 
was a poor country and third-division power. The evolution of Chinese foreign policy described by 
Ferdinand starts from Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine to the realization of the “China dream” during the 
leadership of Xi Jinping, covering more than 50 years. For Deng, the doctrine was to keep a position 
 
88 Z. Zhang, ibidem, p. 700 
89G. C. K. Leung, ‘China’s energy security: Perception and reality’, Energy Policy, Vol. 39 (2011),  p. 1332 
90 Leung, ibidem, pp. 1332-1333 
91 Orazgalieyv S., ‘The role of home governments in entry bargaining of multinationals: China's investment in Central 
Asia's natural resource sector’, Thunderbird International Business, Vol. 62, (2020), pp. 249-262 
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of low profile and not to have imperial implications or superpower aspirations.92 For Hu, the main 
goal was to have a situation of harmony, both internally and externally, because he has a risk-averse 
approach: this approach was still preventing China from having a positive role in international 
politics.93 After Xi became secretary general, the foreign policy approach was that of the “China 
dream” which the BRI belongs to, even if this project represents a negation of Deng’s idea about 
imperial aspirations.94  
The last book I base my work on is “Oil” by Gavin Bridge and Philippe Le Billon. This book 
gives a complete description of how “politics of oil” is hidden in every part of our life and how it 
importantly shapes the economic, social, and political decisions of all the countries, from the 
producers to the consumers. It analyzes the entire chain of production from the extraction to the 
market phase. Among the social consequences discussed in the book, a deep analysis is dedicated to 
the “Dutch Disease”, the exploitation of the workers in the extractive countries, and the economic 
development through oil. For my work, the most useful parts were about the conceptualization and 




 In my dissertation, the analytical part is based on the comparison between the flow of crude 
oil in Kazakhstan and China from 2014 until 2018. More specifically, I will compare the export of 
Kazakhstan to its major destinations and the import of China from the major suppliers. I will compare 
what was the percentage95 of oil exported to China from Kazakhstan and what was the share of this 
 
92 P. Ferdinand, ‘Westward ho-the China dream and ‘one belt one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping, 
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94 Ferdinand, ibidem, p. 949 




export in the total revenues coming from the export sector for Nur-Sultan. In my work, China is to 
mean as the Chinese mainland. In all the statistical elaboration and data, the Special Autonomous 
Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are not considered. The dataset I used for this 
dissertation makes a difference between China, Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR because the three 
entities have economic systems based on different sectors. For China, crude oil represents the second 
most imported goods after electronic integrated circuits, and the import has grown in the last three 
years.96 If we check the trade information about Hong Kong and Macao, we see that oil represent 
respectively the 10th and the 11th most imported good. 97 The two SARs enjoy the arrival from the sea 
routes in terms of oil import because they are two important harbors, and their imported quantity is 
so small that they cannot generate any significant change in the flows I will analyze. Natural resources 
are the main component of the export sector in Kazakhstan, and the country is a net exporter of goods 
rather than an exporter of services.98 Actually, the export sector is the part that keeps positive the 
balance trade, and it has been so all over the five years I will analyze.99  
The data are taken by the UN Comtrade Database, prepared by the United Nations Statistics 
Office. The data were obtained by the research suggested on the UN Comtrade webpage through the 
research based on years, kind of flow (either export or import), classification of the type of product 
(good or service), code of the good, and frequency of the trade (either monthly or annual).100 I have 
taken the 12 most important partners of both China and Kazakhstan in order to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of the flows of the countries. In my research, I also look for data from 
 
96 United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018 International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, 
Trade by Country, (New York: United Nations, 2019), p. 103 
97 United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018 International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, Trade 
by Country, p. 105 and p. 107 
98 United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018 International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, Trade 
by Country, pp. 102-103 
99 United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2014 International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, Trade 
by Country, (New York: United Nations, 2015), p. 212; United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
2015 International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, Trade by Country, (New York: United Nations, 2016), p. 218; United 
Nations-Department of Economics and Social  Affairs, 2016 International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, Trade by 
Country, (New York: United Nations, 2017), p. 220; United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017 
International Trade Statistics Yearbook-Vol. I, Trade by Country, (New York: United Nations, 2019), p. 155  
100 UN Comtrade Database, https://comtrade.un.org/data, consulted on 04/12/2020  
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other sources like the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the United States Energy Information 
Agency (EIA), but at the end, I decided to opt for the data from the UN because they could give me 
more details about the flow of goods. In the beginning, The Kazakh Ministry of Energy and Ministry 
of Industry were my first choices as data sources for my thesis because they were original sources 
about the country I am focusing on. Unfortunately, these webpages are impossible to access from 
Italy, because they result in not existing or with denied access.  
 The good considered in my analysis is the crude oil, which code according to the Harmonized 
System (HS) used in the UN classification of goods is 270900.101 The reason why I chose it is very 
simple: China prefers to import crude oil because it has a large number of refineries on its territory, 
despite should be more convenient to let the crude be refined in Kazakhstan, for example in 
Shymkent, and then take it to China.102 The quantity of oil expressed by the UN dataset is in kilograms 
(kgs). I decided to keep this measure to have more detailed results. Conventionally, the unit of 
measure of the trade flow of oil is the barrel per day (bb/d). As a matter of fact, in the first part of this 
chapter, the data taken by the other sources are expressed in this way, and so do the EIA and the IEA. 
But the issue with this measure is that this dataset is based on the data provided by the single state 
members, and not all the UN members use this convention. The fact that the providers of the data are 
the states themselves and the UN is just the elaborator creates some other problems.  
 In my research for the data, the first thing that captured my attention was the difference 
between the exports to China declared by Kazakhstan and the Chines imports from Kazakhstan. That 
is called ‘bilateral asymmetry’ and it is a common problem in the trade data, even if not common in 
the trade registration flow of energy sources. According to the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the UN there three different causes for the bilateral asymmetries: (I) the use of different 
 
101 For more details about the HS look at the webpage 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/50018/Harmonized-Commodity-Description-and-Coding-Systems-
HS  
102 Amineh and van Driel, ibidem, p. 77  
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criteria in calculating import and export; (II) the use of CIF-type values in import statistics and FOB-
type values in export statistics; (III) the application of different systems in data compilation.103 The 
flows recorded with the CIF-type values consider the values of the good and the services used to bring 
goods from the starting point in the exporting country until the final destination in the importing 
country.104 The FOB-type values consider just a part of the CIF-type values: the section from the 
starting point to the border of the exporting country.105 In a report published by the same office of the 
UN, this problem is deeply analyzed, and one of the suggestions given to repair this problem is the 
calculation of the actual destination of the trade flow through the re-export option.106  
In the database, I took my data from it is possible to select this option, but again the details 
about this flow miss, just in the same way they were not available for the second partner countries. 
Another cause of this asymmetry is the timing of the measurement. Exporting and importing countries 
measure the trade flow differently also according to the time of delivering or sending.107 This is 
especially relevant for the data about China: as we saw in the first paragraph of this chapter, and as 
we will see from my analysis, China heavily relies on the import of oil coming from the Middle East 
and passing through the Strait of Malacca, so the counting of the actual quantity of oil coming from 
abroad is influenced by the distance of the exporting country. I will leave the data in the way I found 
them on the UN website. That because I think that to leave the data as they are considered by the two 
countries can improve the sensibility of my analysis: I will analyses if the relationship has changed 
in term of the relative power of one side in respect to the other through the oil flow, and in the detail, 
I will check if China has increased its relative power against Kazakhstan. In this case, power is the 
ability of country A to use a natural resource -in my case study an energy resource- belonging to 
 
103 United Nations International Trade Statistics, Knowledgebase, 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/50657/Bilateral-asymmetries, consulted on 04/13/2020  
104 United Nations international Trade Statistics, Trade Valuation, 
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107 United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs,  IMTS Bilateral asymmetries – how to measure, analyze, 
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country B for its interests. The natural resource is to be considered vital because is the pillar of country 
B’s national economy and wealth.  But in order to do so, I have to maintain the point of views of the 
two countries, which are represented by the two different ways to measure and count the trade flows.  
The economic data about the Kazakh GDP by sector are downloaded from the Ministry of the 
National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and come from those documents that are available 
in English. Each document compares the GDP data of the year analyzed with the GDP of the previous 
12 months and calculate the variation in Kazakh tenge, in US dollars. In each document, GDP is 
divided into three parts -production of goods, production of services, and added value- and each part 
is divided into sub-sections according to the sector. A special part is dedicated to the energy source 
sector, the represents the main sector for the Kazakh economy. In this case, the description of the 
total value is divided according to the value produced by the three main economic sectors of the 













Chapter 2  
Conceptualization 
In this chapter I will analyze the three variables of my hypothesis: despite the asymmetry 
between two countries, an importing country will meet resistance from the exporting country and will 
not be able to increase its power over it. In this hypothesis the independent variable -energy security 
meant as the security of demand for an importing country - does not lead to an increase of power-the 
dependent variable- over the exporting country and weakest country because the multi-vector policy 
-the intervening variable- will be the instrument the exporting and smallest country B will use to 
preserve its autonomy. In my case study, this is exactly what happened: because of the Chinese always 
increasing activities of the Chinese oil firms in the Kazakh oil sector, the Kazakh export was driven 
to other destinations. In this way, the Kazakh state prevented the chance that the revenues coming 
from the oil sector -which represents the pillar of the Kazakh economy- would come only from one 
source -in this case China- making the country economy dependent on the decisions taking abroad. 
In other words, there is not a linear causal relationship between the independent and the dependent 




The concept of energy security is one of the problems that many countries in the world have 
to face and it has become always more important over the last years. Many approaches have been 
used to study this problem. When you analyze energy security, you have to consider that there is not 
a single definition for the concept and that it can change according to the theoretical approaches I 
mentioned in the first chapter. According to the Realist tradition, energy security is a concept that 
should be applied in the same way to all the countries without taking into account the real necessities 
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of each case, and takes the name of “mercantilism”.108 The main problem is that this concept was 
born from the energy crisis during the 1970s and since then it has developed following approaches 
different from Realism. Many scholars agree that energy security should be defined according to the 
kind of source, the geographical position of a country, the distance between importing and exporting 
states, economic factors, and political contexts.109 This means to give to the concept a shape that is 
neither totally Realist nor totally Liberal.  
 One of the most famous definitions given to energy security was conceptualized by Yergin in 
1988. He defined energy security as the objective “to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at 
reasonable prices in a way that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives”.110 Yergin 
emphasizes some aspects that in the following decades would have been developed by other scholars 
and that have brought to other definitions of energy security, focused on other perspectives. The main 
is that energy security is the consequence of a situation of asymmetry111 in the distribution of the 
resources. It means that energy resources are geographically concentrated only in few spots in the 
world and that the exporting states that have to defend from this asymmetry are the manipulation of 
prices and resources operated by the importing states.112 
 Another paramount definition of energy security was given by Sovacool and Mukherjee in 
2011. This definition is more technical than the one given by Yergin. The two authors define energy 
security as “a complex goal involving questions about how to equitably provide available, affordable, 
reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, properly governed and socially acceptable energy 
services”.113 In this definition five dimensions that are considered: availability, affordability, 
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technology development, sustainability, and regulation.114 For dimension there is a definition. 
Availability is the actual possession of the resources and infrastructure to transform them into energy; 
affordability is the access to energy services at the lowest price possible; technology development 
regards the new investment in the energy sector; sustainability involves the less impact on the 
environment; regulation concerns the application of good strategic policies in the market.115 This 
definition is maybe the most comprehensive ever given about energy security. But the authors also 
emphasize that it is impossible to give a definitive and proper definition of energy security, and the 
risk is to oscillate between a definition only applicable to specific case studies and a too wider one.116 
In the following paragraphs I will gather both the typologies of definition.  
 Bridge and Le Billon are two scholars who also categorized different dimensions in energy 
security, which is defined “the maintenance of a reliable supply at prices that are affordable to 
consumers yet profitable enough to justify investments in future productions”.117 Their assumption is 
that energy security works like a normal market made up of offer and demand, those characteristics 
shape the inherent characteristics of the trade flow. Importing and exporting countries share one goal: 
guarantee energy security for their economic systems.118 This reciprocal relationship is at the base of 
the trade of energy security, and for the two scholars in the countries involved in this relationship 
must secure this flow of revenues by reducing the geostrategic and market vulnerabilities: for energy 
resources importing country the aim is to have always a direct and secure flow by trying to reduce 
external risks -it means political and economic tensions that can cut the flow- while for exporting 
country the goal is to maintain a significant source of economic revenues for the national economy 
by reducing the internal tensions.119 The dimensions that Bridge and Le Billon differentiate in the 
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concept are availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability.120 They do not further that the 
definition given by Sovacool.  Also Van de Graaf and Zulli in the book edited by them partially use 
the dimensions listed above.  
For Bridge and Le Billon, affordability is about guaranteeing a continuous economic access 
to energy resources through stable prices and good infrastructure.121 Availability is instead about the 
quantity of oil in the world reserves and the geographical location: according to the authors, this 
criterion is crucial for the petrostates like Kazakhstan because the presence of oilfields brings the 
interferences of external actors (mainly great powers) and increases the dependence on export and 
the sense of vulnerability.122 While for Van de Graaf and Zulli, affordability means low and stable 
prices in order to “increase planning and investment security”, and availability is related to the 
diversification of independent energy fuel and resources.123 The last dimension the authors share is 
acceptability, that can be called social acceptability. In this case, the definition given by the authors 
match because in both cases, this dimension can be defined as the people’s opinion about an energy 
source in relation to the positive or negative effects on society.124 The criterion of accessibility in 
Bridge and Le Billon is to be meant as the geographical access to the source, different from the 
economic access.125 While Van de Graaf and Zulli stress more the ecological aspect, as a sign of a 
new approach about energy security that has spread in the last years; as a matter of fact the last 
criterion, sustainability, is defined as the effects of the use of an energy resource on the 
environment.126 Amirov et al. also used this operationalization in their explanation about the meaning 
of energy security in Kazakhstan.127 They differentiate from the previous authors because do not put 
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the need for functioning infrastructure in the affordability dimension, but rather in the dimension 
“efficiency”.128  
 In some cases, the environmental aspect has been treated as the main one. That is the cases of 
the book “Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change”, in which one of the authors, Symon, 
sustains that all the energy policies are to be drawn from the ultimate goal that is economic 
externalities’ zero impact on the environment: The definition that Symon gives is “the attainment of 
energy supply and use patterns that are consistent with achieving a good life for all”, in other words, 
people’s energy need must not pollute the environment.129  The last words are important because they 
integrate energy security in a wider discourse in which human security is the object. Energy security 
entered on this discourse in 2003 when the UN Commission on Human Security (CHS) enhanced 
human security by differentiating the two pillars of the concept: freedom for want and freedom from 
fear.130 Energy security belongs to the first pillar.131  
  Another scholar who takes the economic interests of each country and the factors that 
influence energy resources trade as a starting point for the conceptualization is Bobo Lo.  Lo states 
his conceptualization from the definition given by Stulberg, who defines energy security the 
“protection against the loss of welfare that may occur as a result of a change in price or availability 
of a strategic resource”, and apply this definition to the energy relations between Russia and China 
after 2008.132 Starting from the price factor, and the economic effects on sellers and buyers, Lo 
declares that energy security is the sum of security of supply and security of demand, that together 
create an “imperfect complementarity”.133  
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 Dannreuther defines energy security in a way different from the operationalization of the 
concept in four dimensions. He argues that the lack of a universal definition is not a negative aspect 
and a case-by-case definition is actually a good way to compensate this problem.134 In any case, 
energy security needs to be defined according to the political level it is applied (discrete vs. systemic); 
according to the different energy resources; and according to the distinction between the supply of 
energy resources or energy services.135 In the first case, energy security is to be meant as the reactions 
to the perceived threat and risks caused at the political level either by single actors’ voluntary acts or 
the processes at the international system.136 The pattern of the reduction of threats and risks is also 
replicated in the different kinds of energy resources: in this case, the risks are linked to the role of the 
economic chain (with oil being the resource with fewer risks associated).137 Finally, in the last case, 
Dannreuther says that energy security is the minimization to the risks and threats coming from the 
dependency on energy services.138 If we compare this conceptualization with the previous ones, we 
see two important characteristics: the first one is that Dannreuther emphasizes the political 
implications of energy security, the second is that this theorization does not go away from the Bridge’s 
and Le Billon’s one because when it analyzes the political level, Dannreuther recognizes that 
suppliers and demanders have different priorities and different securities.139 
 The different point of view of energy-supplying and energy-demanding countries has also 
been explained as a matter of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘security’ considerations.140 According to Mathur, 
energy abundant states usually have the former approach because the way they can enjoy their reserve 
is seen as an act to reinforce their sovereignty in respect of external influence; while energy-deficient 
countries have the latter because they have to counter the market or supply risks.141 The approach can 
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be classified under the Realist umbrella: it emphasizes the role of the states,  that use energy security 
in order to survive in the international arena. The second approach also is Realist: the “security” issue 
as meant by the authors is not the result of a process of securitization, but it is a mere fact of which 
society and public opinion do not need to be convinced of. This differentiation could perfectly be 
applied to my case study, because all the measures that China has undertaken belong to the second 
approach, while Kazakhstan, as I will explain, has acted in this perspective in order to maintain 
control over its resources. By following these approaches, we are able to have a definition of energy 
security for each state existing. In the following paragraphs, I will explain the different perspectives 
of the major actors involved in the energy market and that have geopolitical interests in Central Asia.  
 For the United States, the most important definition was given by the Department of Energy 
Security in 1985, which defined energy security the supply “of energy at reasonable cost” for “US 
consumers from both domestic and foreign sources”.142 The definition continues “It means that the 
nation is less vulnerable to disruptions in energy supply and that it is better prepared to handle them 
if occur”.143 For the Russian Federation, energy security is about prioritizing access to consumer 
markets while keeping under the state control the energy infrastructure.144 Russia and USA share 
some similar aspects: both of them are energy-producing countries that have to satisfy their internal 
markets and their geopolitical plans, in which energy plays a crucial role. For China, Leung applies 
the definition given by Yergin mentioned above to the Chinese case because there are all the 
characteristics given perfectly suit for China.145 The point that Leung sustains as the main aspect of 
the Chinese energy security is the will to keep the prices at a “reasonable” level.146 For India energy 
security is to be understood as the supply of energy in a lifetime -it means perpetual- “to all our 
citizens as well as meet their effective demand for sale and convenient energy to satisfy various needs 
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at affordable costs […]”.147 Central Asian countries are usually divided into two groups regarding the 
issue of energy security: one half is those of energy importers -Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan- and the 
other is the one of energy exporters -Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.148 For these 
countries, the concept of energy security is linked to “the ability to guarantee a regular flow of 
revenues through the export of resources at a convenient price”.149 Even international organizations 
and international forums have given their own definitions of energy security. The most prominent 
international organization in dealing with energy security is the IEA, which has defined energy 
security as the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”.150 The IEA’s 
definition is of course influenced by the oil shocks of the beginning of the 1970s that brought to the 
creation of the Agency because the definition stresses the continuous availability of energy as a 
starting point. 
 Some scholars have categorized the definition of energy security given in the past. These 
categorizations go beyond the normal approaches that I have described above, and they try to be as 
much methodologic as possible. This is the example of Szulecki, who differentiates three analytical 
approaches in the study of energy security regarding the goal the definition aims at: inductive, 
deductive, and abductive approach.151 The inductive approach tries to capture all the different 
technical and political shades that usually are used to define energy security.152 This category is the 
wider of the three and the most important definitions of energy security, like the one by Sovacool and 
the one by Yergin or Dannreuther, belong to this category. But also the one that reflects the points of 
view of the single states, because according to Szulecki, the perception of energy security in this 
category varies due to resource endowment, geographical location, and infrastructure.153 The second 
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category is the abductive approach that less popular in the scholarship and has as a starting point the 
observation of the context.154 Then, from this, the author gives an explanation; in this case, the 
definition of energy security does not act as an object.155 As an example of this approach, Szulecki 
takes Ciută as an example, because his pragmatic explanation of energy security as driven by different 
“logics” according to the situation.156 The last approach is called deductive, which tries to 
conceptualize the idea “analytically sharp and useful” to create a definition that meets all the scientific 
requirements and then to be applied without considering the specific cases of application.157 
 The concept of energy security has also been discussed by academia from an opposite point 
of view. In some cases, scholars do not talk of energy security, but rather of “energy insecurity”. This 
is a view of the concept from a different angle that actually makes the conceptualization more difficult 
because the scholars, just like for energy security, do not agree on the definition. Grigas defines 
energy insecurity as the “constrained access to supplies or acute dependence on undiversified 
import”158 and Mathur defines it as “the loss of welfare that may occur as the result of a change in 
price or availability of energy”.159 The definition by Grigas is more similar to the definitions of energy 
security mentioned above because she theorized a relation of interdependence between the supplying 
country and the importing country, which has two options to face its needs.160 The first option is 
called “politics of supply” and it is a set of economic and political tools to achieve its political and 
security interests in the energy market.161 The second option is called “politics of dependence” and it 
differs from the previous because it is usually pursued by the importing countries that are in a 
disproportionate position of dependence in relation to the exporting country.162 The relation between 
the importing and exporting countries is called “interdependence” or “asymmetrical degrees of 
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dependence”.163 Grigas theorized this framework for gas and not for oil, and there is a third factor 
that she considers in this relation: the transit countries. In the gas market transit countries play a 
crucial role because e they count on a set of policies called “politics of transit”.164 The definition of 
energy security given by Mathur is more economically oriented, while the one by Grigas is based on 
geopolitical problems of the importing countries. 
 
Operationalization  
I will give a definition of energy security based on three factors that I found common in all 
the definitions previously explained: the distinction between exporting and importing country, the 
economic aspects, and the geopolitical consequences. Energy security can be defined as the 
maintenance of a constant flow of export of the national energy resources (security of supply) that 
meets the needs of an importing country looking for constant and diversified flow from different 
countries (security of demand). For the measurement, the indicators I will use are the percentage of 
energy revenues on the total annual export for exporting countries and the diversification of 
destinations and importing countries. The first indicator explains the weight of the oil revenues in the 
trade balance of a state as an economic sector. In order to maintain its security of supply constant, 
each producer state must keep the same percentage of revenues coming from the export of crude oil. 
The analysis of the 16 most important oil export states in the period show that the level of the revenues 
may oscillate,165 and reduce -or increase- the security of supply of a country. I divide the level of 
revenues into a five-grade scale according to the percentage of revenues on the total export – “low”, 
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“moderate”, “high”, “very high”, and “extremely high” level. The “low” level means that the energy-
exporting country can afford to keep for itself the energy sources -crude oil is maximum the 5% of 
the total export sector-; “moderate” means that the revenues from the energy resources are an 
important source for the export sector, even though not paramount -up to 15%-; “high” means that 
the producer counts on the revenues as one of the most important assets in the export sector and the 
trade balance -between 15% and 50% of export-; “very high” means that the revenues from energy 
resources are the basis of the trade balance and the economy -between 35% and 50%-; “extremely 
high” means that the energy sector is the only source of revenues for the export sector and sustain by 
itself the trade balance -crude oil represents more than one half of the export.   
 











Extremely High > 50% 
 
High 12 
Very High 35% − 50%  
 
High 11 
High  15% − 35% 
 
Medium  10 
Moderate  5% − 15% 
 
Medium 9 
Low  < 5% Low 8 
 
 
The second indicator, the one for importing countries, explains how wide and differentiated 
is the provision of crude oil coming from exporting countries for importing countries. Like in the first 
indicator and the data for the analysis of my case study, the data are taken by the UN Comtrade 
website.166 I calculated the average number of energy suppliers for the top 15 crude importing 
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countries in the world, I used this average as a medium level scale to calculate the security of demand. 
According to this scale, when an importing country gets 90% of its crude oil from 9 or 10 countries 
its level of security of demand is “medium”, below this level security of demand is “low”, above is 
“high”.167 The two dimensions should lead to an idea of energy security in which both the parts, 
supplier and buyer, strengthen the flow between them in order to earn revenues -the exporting 
country- and to have the wider access to oil sources -the importing country.  
 
 
The Concept of Power 
 Power has maybe been the core concept of politics and international relations for many years. 
In the last two centuries, this concept has been analyzed not only as a relationship between states, but 
also between agents acting in the society, and in this last classification also the relationships between 
two persons have been studied as relations of power. But power had been analyzed even before. One 
of the main authors to study the concept of power in the modern age was Niccolò Machiavelli who 
considered power the purpose of politics to be measured by the extent to which is achieved.168 In the 
following centuries, a first peak in the discussion was the 17th century when Hobbes published his 
famous “The Leviathan”. Hobbes defined power as the “present means” of a man “to obtain some 
future apparent Good”169. This definition is of course one of the most important in the discussion of 
the topics because it was given in a period in which intellectuals in Europe were discussing the roots 
of the absolute power of the European kings in that century. The main aspect of his thought is that 
power comes from the freedom of the men who decide to give up on it in order to protect themselves 
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from each other -homo homini lupus.170 The main aspect of his view is that power, even the power of 
the king that at that time meant sovereignty, was established on a relationship between the conflicting 
agents of the society, the single men.171 By word of Hobbes himself, mankind has a “Perpetual and 
restless desire for Power after power, that ceases only in Death”.172 If we were to have a complete 
picture of how power was meant in the same century, then we must compare Hobbes with Locke’s 
idea of power given in his work “Essay of Civil Government”. The main difference between the two 
authors is in the feelings that found power in society. If for Hobbes men were moved by fear and self-
protection, for Locke power -that he means as legitimation of the state- is created by the spontaneous 
act of the men acting in the society, completely free from constrains and fear, and their consensus.173 
The word “Power” is used for the first time by Locke to define the branches of the government. The 
conceptualization of Hobbes and Locke were the most important for centuries.  
A new idea of power as one of the pillars of the society came in the second half of the 19th 
century thanks to the works of Max Weber. Weber defined power as “the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance”.174 This 
definition is important because is an evolution of the definitions of the previous centuries. Weber’s 
concept is about the idea of dominance and control over social affairs175 and the concept may be 
understood as “power over”. For Weber power is a casual relationship in which the main actor is the 
state in what he recognizes being its main prerogative: the practice of violence.176 So the probability 
that an actor will follow what the other actor wants is linked to the practice of power and the ability 
to exercise it. Power as domination is the essence of politics that, because of it, is to be considered a 
fight.177 So, just like among people, among states the subordinated relationship is caused by the 
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actions -praxis- of a state in its inherent priority.178 If we compare this idea with the concept of 
Hobbes, and generally of the 17th century, we see that there is no continuity in terms of nature, because 
the latter is understood as “power to”.179 It means that power is a capacity that an agent possesses,180 
while in the former is the expression of domination and violence, a cultural characteristic of  Western 
society.181 
 
Power in contemporary Political Science 
To have a more comprehensive discourse about the idea of power in the field of political 
science, we must go to the 20th century. After WWI and WWII, the debate about the concept began a 
pillar of the new discipline and in particular In International Relations. So, the state became the 
theoretical unit for the study of power. In this period realism was the only theoretical framework. 
Realism has given a great impulse to the discourse and the most important scholar in defining power 
in this framework was Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau theorized his idea of power and politics at the 
beginning of the Cold War. His thought was influenced by Max Weber, but his idea of power and 
politics were shaped by the academic engagement with Carl Schmitt.182 Power is pursued in 
politics,183 that is the basic human activity. The basic definition of this relationship is “man’s control 
over the minds and actions of other men”.184 It can be defined as a mean to an end, and it is the 
determining motive of any political action, and it is physically based on a relationship.185 Applied to 
politics, the objective of Morgenthau’s study, power is “the relations between those that exercise 
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power and those on which it is exercised”.186 In international politics, what the states compete for is 
the superiority of a nation over the others. Once a nation reaches this superiority through power, the 
others react to reduce the gap of power. This mechanism is called “balance of power” and it is the 
natural mechanism of international politics.187 The interest of all the states is to gain more and more 
power in order to have political superiority in the international arena. This power maximization 
triggers a perpetual mechanism -the struggle for power- which is in other words the struggle for the 
survival of each state.188  
Morgenthau measured the power in terms both material capabilities189 like geography, 
national resources, industrial capacity, the state of military preparedness, and population;190 but for 
some authors include also immaterial capabilities like national character, national morale, quality of 
diplomacy, and the quality of government.191 The presence of the latter category may be considered 
an intrusion in classical Realism, but not all the scholars agree on that point. If Pichler points out that 
according to Morgenthau the power struggle is the ‘objective’ order of international relations,192 
Williams sustains that ideas and morals had a role in defining the idea of power and politics in 
Morgenthau’s theory.193 The real concept of power meant by Morgenthau, explains Williams, stands 
in the fact that power is to be understood as interest,194 and because of that it is not a rigid idea but 
rather a flexible one, that can be applied not only to politics but to any aspect of social life.195 Williams 
continues by saying that the possible application to any sphere of society makes power in politics 
separated from any other kinds of power, that balanced the binary relations between political power 
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and violence.196 In conclusion, if the concept of power as meant by Morgenthau could be applied to 
other parts of the society, it means that the relationship is constrained by the obligation between those 
who exercise power and those who are under that power, gaining an ethical dimension.197 
 The following generation of scholars was strongly influenced by Morgenthau in defining 
power. The debate was also helped by the evolution of the Cold War and the investment of the two 
superpowers -USA and USSR- in their atomic programs. At the end of the 1950s, and at the beginning 
of the next one, some of the most important definitions of power were given. The one given by Robert 
Dahl is probably among the most important. Dahl’s definition of power is “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”.198 In his analysis, Dahl 
goes behind Morgenthau’s idea even if he shares the basic point: that power is a relationship, even if 
Dahl calls it “connection”.199  This connection must exist beforehand between the two actors. This 
connection is a type of causation200 triggered by the behavior of the two actors.201 Different from 
Morgenthau, Dahl sustains that power is not a mechanical relation in which A’s will affects and 
causes immediately B’s reaction, but there is a time lag in which B’s reaction must be triggered.202 B 
then never has the same reaction: according to the input received by A, this reaction is variable. The 
kind of variation B will have, represents the scope of A’s power, that it is measured by the probability 
that b is going to react. 203 Turcsanyi classified this idea of power in the typology “power to”.204 The 
main factors are the means that A possesses to cause B’s reaction,205 means that can be called 
capabilities. Unfortunately, the definition of Dahl does not specify the kind of capabilities, but what 
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he emphasizes is that any actor who possesses capabilities has to mobilize all of them for his 
purpose.206 His definition is meant to concentrate on the main aspect, and the same author specifies 
that it is not easy to be applied to different specific cases.207 One of the critics that the following 
literature has made to Dahl’s concept is that he emphasizes too much the purpose of actor A, giving 
more importance to the control of outcomes than actors.208 For this reason, his definition has been 
classified as “outcome definition”.209 
 
Variations and Criticisms 
 One of the authors that moved further the definition given by Dahl is Holsti. His definition of 
power is: “the act or acts that A commits toward B so the B pursues a course of behavior in accordance 
with A’s wishes”.210 The concept can be broken down into three elements: power as a process, power 
as an influence, and power as a reaction.211 According to Holsti power works like a process, and just 
like in Dahl it works in time. The authors had different opinions about the idea of power as ‘influence’. 
Dahl used the words “power”, “influence” and “control” interchangeably,212 while in Holsti influence 
is just aspect of power and it is the main instrument that a country possesses, and capabilities are used 
to improve the influence over B.213 Capabilities, according to Holsti, can be material or immaterial, 
but in any case, they must be used in accordance with the ends.214 In international relations, states are 
the actors of the relationships, and there are three forms in the relation of influence between them: 
relation of consensus, the relation of manipulation, and the relation of coercion; each relation reflects 
a different grade of influence from cooperation to coercion.215 What is important here is that relations 
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are not fixed, then the interactions between two countries can variate in the time and go up and down 
from a relation to another.216  
 This graduality of power is also at the center of the conceptualization done by Miller. His 
definition of power –“power is the perceived capacity of the legitimate leader(s) of sovereign political 
unit to imposes his (their) self-conscious will on the legitimate leader(s) of another (other) sovereign 
political unit(s) in a particular relational instance”- underlines the difference between the intensity of 
the preference of legitimate leaders of a state and the actual actions brought about. This difference is 
called “effective power” and it is measured by the range of options that the legitimate leaders in the 
two countries of the relationship have and the scale of preference of the leaders.217 The role that Miller 
gives to the legitimate leader of a state is crucial because he goes beyond the simple the states are 
black boxes and have inherent goals.  
 A curious case is the definition of power is given by Clark. Clark’s definition of power is 
made up of 15 different dimensions.218 These dimensions are studied at the local level but according 
to the author can be applied to other frameworks like international relations.219 The dimensions are 
interpersonal influence; anticipated reactions; direct and indirect influence; reciprocity; action and 
inaction; the pattern of value distribution; legitimation; the number of participation in the decision; 
the scope of power; visibility; power bases; application of power; efficiency of power application; 
allocation of resources; stratification of power.220 These dimensions do not work altogether at the 
same time, but according to the cases some are more prominent than others.221 This definition 
represents an exception to the general debate that in that decade saw also some critics to the 
mainstream idea. The last critic was made by Hayes. He criticized the weaknesses of the discourse’s 
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basis. In his opinion, power is “a relational concept which implies the interaction or the juxtaposition 
of two or more persons or group of persons” that if applied for states ca be defined “State A got State 
B to do X”.222 Even if Hayes does simplifies the definition of power in this way, he presents a critic 
to the classical conceptualization of power in three points: it does not determine the amount of power 
possessed by the states, the differences of goals among the states, and the nature of the power itself.223 
This critic appears weak and unjustified if we consider that the definition of Hayes is one of the most 
simplified in the field. But in my opinion, it gave the basis for further developments of the concept 
of power that would take place in the following years. 
 
Power according to sociology  
  In that period the concept was being analyzed also by other scholars belonging to different 
backgrounds. The sociologist Talcott Parson in 1963 gave a singular explanation of the concept of 
power by comparing it to the economy. As a sociologist, Parson emphasizes the mechanism of power 
not among a group of states, but among a group of individuals. He is not the only scholar that in the 
second half of the last century who analyzed power. Also Hannah Arendt and gave their contribution 
to the development of the concept.  
 Parson starts from the assumption that in the society, political and economic aspects work in 
the same way because they share some parallelisms.224 The first parallelism is that both politics and 
economy are abstract; the second aspect is that they are applied to collectivity according to the actions 
and the goals of the collectivity itself; the third is that the collective actions are to be understood in 
politics as an equivalent of production in the economy.225 In this comparison, power represents for 
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politics what money represents for the economic systems: the fuel that makes the system works.226 In 
Parsons’ words power is “the generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations 
by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to 
their on collective goals”227 The formal definition of power given by Parsons is a complex explanation 
in which he defined two aspects of power: legitimation and generalization. Generalization of power 
implies that the power has just a “symbolic” meaning and it is not material, and it can go from an 
individual to other thanks to “legitimation”, that is parallel to confidence in the economy.228 Those 
that can get to achieve the confidence of the other individuals in the society are more likely to lead 
the mechanisms of the society against those who do not share their positions and ideas. This position 
is the same that Arendt uses when she explains her idea of power: she defined power as the “human 
ability not just to act but to act in concert”.229 This definition goes along with the idea that there is a 
correlation between power and authority.230 As we see, these definitions stay inside some other 
conceptualizations, like the one by Miller and the one by Clark, in which legitimation was an 
important aspect. What pushes Parsons beyond of these authors is that once an individual has been 
legitimized, he gains power from others that lose it. This means that power is a zero-sum game.231 As 
we saw previously, even Clark talked about the zero-sum problem about the concept of power. The 
critics he moves to Parsons’ idea is that there are a few chances to see this possibility applied to an 
empirical case.232 The typical examples are the power-vacuum situations in which a country -or an 
individual- in a political system increases its power as a consequence of the diminishing power of 
others, for Clark situations in which both the states’ gain are unlikely to happen.233  
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The revival of the Realism  
 In the decade of the 1970s, new conceptualizations of power came up, reshaping the general 
idea of power in International Relations. In that decade, scholars started to differentiate the typologies 
of power according to different frameworks and situations. Carroll in his essay ‘The Cult of Power’ 
analyzed the idea throughout the meaning that power may have in different interpretations. He 
differentiated 9 different types of power: disintegrative power; inertial power; innovative power; 
legitimizing power; expressive power; explosive power; the power of resistance; collective power; 
population power.234 I think that the contribution by Carroll was paramount for the development of 
the concept because he explains how power can go beyond the discourse of power as simple 
‘influence’ or ‘authority’. This classification also a couple of aspects to emphasize: the first is that it 
passes the idea of power as a consequence of a legitimation process as emphasized by Parson, Clark, 
and Miller; the second is that it passes the idea of power as ‘autonomy’ of a state to gain its national 
security.235 All his kinds of powers are consequences of actions inside the society, but they are 
completed just by some portions of it, according to the rules, goals, or capabilities belonging to these 
portions of society.236 The point is that in these types, rules and goals could be set not by the affected 
group, but from other groups. I want to describe some examples here. The first kind of power -
disintegrative power- belongs to basically everyone, because aims at the collapse of social 
organizations or political organizations; so it can be used by large masses.237 Expressive power is the 
power of the ‘powerless’, who use it to demonstrate their discontent about mechanisms and norms in 
the society.238 Finally, the last kind of power -migratory power- has features of both the previous two 
because it is of the ‘powerless’ and used by large masses, but in this case the masses can be influenced 
by policies that do not aim at the collapse of a political system.239 
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 In 1972 was publishes “Theory of International Politics” by Kenneth Waltz. In this book, the 
author discusses power just in respect of the means that a state possesses.240 The consideration Waltz 
gave to power is a merely quantitative problem: those who have more material possibilities, have 
more power in the international arena. So, power is a mere quantitative concept.241 If we compare 
Waltz with Morgenthau, the idea of power does not aim at conquering or balancing other states, 
because Waltz explains that power is used by states just to survive and not to destroy rivals, and 
because of that his theory is called ‘structural realism’ or ‘defensive realism’.242 This point was 
against the one expressed by Williams that we discussed above, but in the Realist framework is 
important because thirty years later Mearsheimer would develop a theory in which power plays a 
central point in relation to the actual means that a state possesses. Mearsheimer in his ‘offensive 
realism’ theory defines power as “the currency of great powers politics, and States compete for it”.243 
For ‘great powers’ he meant those countries that in the international arena are the ones able to shape 
the balance of power. He compares power and money in the same way Parsons did, with the only 
difference that in his description of the international arena, Mearsheimer does not consider it ruled 
by the same mechanisms that belong to economics.244 What Mearsheimer emphasizes of power is the 
possibility to be measured in terms of military capabilities for great powers, in this way economic 
power is called ‘latent power’ that is not the proper way to measure the capabilities of the great 
powers; the military capabilities of a country are the best way, and in particular the land military 
capabilities.245 The great powers that can maintain the military supremacy on the land will be able to 
emerge as the main actors of the international arena. In the case of Mearsheimer’s theory, power is 
understood as pure ‘power over’.  
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Nye and the new ideas of Power  
 I consider the theory by Waltz and Mearsheimer a reaction of the Realist theorists, especially 
in the years in which some scholars tried to redefine the concept of power in more complex terms. 
Among them, the one who probably gave a total new contribution was Joseph Nye. His first 
contribution was with the book “Power and Interdependence” published in 1977 and co-authored with 
Robert Keohane. The idea of power that the authors explain is the one of a bijective relation between 
states that has three different explanations.246 The first is that interdependence is a mere 
interconnection between two states; the second explanation is that interdependence is an interaction 
which implies a cost for both the parts; the third explanation -the one preferred by the authors- is that 
the costs of the relationship -in other words, how much the parts have to give up on- are equally 
distributed.247 In this way, power implies a lost, a position completely distant from the ‘zero-sum’ 
game as pictured by Parsons and Clark. Both the parts lose, but the meaning of this lost stays in the 
way a mutual potential power is created.248  
 The role of power is then explained by distinguishing between “sensibility” and 
“vulnerability”.249 The former is the scale of grades that every country possesses to answer any 
external situation; while the latter is the “relative availability and the costs of the alternatives that 
actors have to handle”.250 Between the two, vulnerability is the prominent one because is the factor 
that will be considered the most in case of political choice.251 At this point is important to have focus 
on the capabilities of the states. We already saw that according to Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, 
capabilities are to be understood as material capabilities and more specifically, in terms of military 
capabilities, that are the only ones able to give the measure of how strong a country is. We also saw 
that for Holsti, capabilities can be both material and immaterial. In this regard, Keohane and Nye 
 
246 Baldwin, ibidem, p. 175 
247 Baldwin, ibidem, pp. 175-176 
248 Baldwin, ibidem, p. 177 
249 Creus, ibidem, p. 69 
250 Creus, ibidem, p. 69 
251 Creus, ibidem, p. 70 
54 
 
again go beyond the first ideas by criticizing the military capabilities like the only ones to consider, 
but they also go beyond the Holsti’s opinion. They affirm that to use military force to measure power 
is ambiguous and debatable.252 Military force would be the best option to measure power if you would 
ignore the costs of the relationships,253 but this is an extreme case that only took place when 
economics is put apart and it is not enough to overcome military power.254 Economic capabilities are 
also to consider in the range of capabilities and they are as important as military force. The reason is 
simple: Keohane and Nye sustain that power has a contextual nature, so it is linked to the policy-
contingency framework. 255 
Nye did not stop to this analysis of power. His studies moved forward and his main 
contribution to the discourse is connected to the conceptualization of “soft power” in 1990. Soft 
power was defined “the ability to get what one wants through persuasion or attraction other that 
coercion”256 and later “to obtain the results that you want with the force of attraction, without using 
the offered incentives”.257 The main point of these two definitions is that power has changed because 
capabilities have changed. The mere military power belongs to states, but in a modern world, there 
some other actors that play important roles in international politics.258 The new capabilities are those 
regarding economics, technology, and education because are able to change the behavior of the 
state.259 Nye wrote that in the post-Cold War period, and in my opinion this is to take into account in 
his theory: it is not a case that the rise of the academic debate was in the 1960s. In that period the 
confrontation between USSR and the USA was a simple race in the disposition of missiles in 
geostrategic points in order to keep the enemy on target, while other actors had risen since the 1970s 
making the situation more complex. Despite the change in the capabilities, Nye does not deny that 
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power is a relation and the interdependence between states.260 But what he affirms is that 
interdependence does not always mean harmony: the relation may be balanced in a way that implies 
a manipulation from one state to the other.261 Furthermore, the interdependence is variable according 
to the sphere is which exists: security, trade, finance.262 We notice that Nye still explains 
interdependence in the same terms which he used in 1977, what he adds is that the ability of the states, 
in this case lays in the creation of a strong linkage with another state despite being vulnerable.263 
A critic to Nye was moved by Rothman, who criticized this dichotomy between hard and soft 
power.264 According to Rothman, the way Nye discusses power is essentially idealized and he 
suggests that hard and soft power belong to the same spectrum of power and united through four 
categories that create a continuum of power types.265 These four categories are command and military 
resources; economic forms of power; agenda-setting and institutional control; framing and rhetoric.266 
Hard power and soft power as spectrums of the same range is the only novelty added in this critic: 
the four power types are the four ways that Nye analyzed about how power can be exercised: one 
belongs to hard power -military resources- and three to soft power -economic forms of power, agenda-
setting, and framing.267 The agenda-setting type and the framing type of power, have brought some 
scholars to consider another kind of power -normative power- like a twin of soft power, but others, 
like Kawalski disagree with this idea.268 For Kawalski, normative power is the quality of making your 
point of view socially accepted in International Relations which is characterized by asymmetry 
relations.269 If for Nye in a relation between states, one state co-opted the preferences of its partner 
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because the former had been able to create a situation that influenced the former,270 for Kawalski the 
effects of normative power are more tangible than the ones of the soft power because they are 
wider.271 I think that a normative power application separated from soft power is poor and lacking 
the ideological strength that characterizes it: normative power is the transformation in recognized 
norms of ideas that are shared by a group of states. To affirm that the two are separated means to deny 
the attraction of the intangible capabilities that Nye affirmed to be the new tools in International 
Relations. 
The concept of smart power is a synthesis of hard power and soft power. Nye himself 
discussed the relations between the three concepts in his book “Leadership and Power” published in 
2008. Nye defines smart power as a simple combination of hard and soft power that in some cases 
strengthens each other because they both aim at one goal after a competition, and they both have to 
be used when a politician is in search of leadership.272  
So when a leader is willing to reach a position of leadership through smart power, he must 
apply at the time policies that belong to a type or the other. Other scholars have studied smart power. 
In the case of Wilson, he added that smart power is not only the capacity to use instruments from soft 
and hard power, but also to know the limits of each instrument in order to alternate them.273 If a 
government was to apply smart power to his foreign policy, that would mean to reform many 
institutional frameworks.274 If we consider this application, then smart power looks like normative 
power. The relationship between the two types of power was also analyzed by Gallaroti, who defined 
smart power one corollary of soft power.275 Gallaroti sustained that the relation between soft and hard 
power is more complicated than how Nye describes it: they reinforce each other in some cases, but 
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essentially they are not perfect complement, making the demarcation deeper and sharper.276 The basis 
of this affirmation is that there is no distinction between soft capabilities and hard capabilities: what 
in the scholarship has considered hard -like military power- can be used to generate soft power and 
vice versa.277 Gallaroti sustained that the application of smart power depends on the context and the 
consequences that it may have in it, and the policymakers have to look for net power rather than 
nominal power.278 Gallaroti also sustained that the effects of smart power are necessarily indirect and 
work in the long term.279 
All the approaches that I have analyzed so far can be summed into two theoretical frameworks: 
realism and neo-Liberalism. There is another theoretical framework that has studied the idea of power 
in the last decades: the constructivist approach. The constructivist approach has studied power starting 
from the question “what does power do?” and not “what power is?”,280 and tend to understand power 
like a concept both agential and intersubjective.281 In the last years, the most prominent definition of 
power from a constructivist approach has been given by Guzzini. According to him, the concept of 
power is a dyad between two concepts: governance and power, that must be analyzed together.282 The 
former is defined “the capacity of intersubjective practices to effects” while the latter the “capacity” 
of transforming resources, which affects social relationships”.283 Governance and power act in the 
framework of social interactions in which one agent can be privileged by the setting of an agenda 
shaped by the bargaining of the structure represented by the governance.284 The outcome of these 
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interactions shapes both power and governance because create the identities, the preferences, and the 
basic action of power and the intersubjectivity of governance.285  
 
Operationalization  
 As we saw, conceptualizing power is not easy because many aspects must be considered. The 
definition I want to give is power as the relationship in which one agent (state) tries to increase the 
control over the vital economic resources belonging to another agent (state). This definition is shaped 
by the idea of power by Krasner, who inside the neo-realist approach takes specifically economic 
resources in the definition of power. So, my definition inserts in the theoretical framework I that 
moment in which the evolution of the idea of power is starting to consider other kinds of resources 
different from the classical ones. It cannot be considered neo-Liberal as the definition of Soft Power 
given by Nye, but it already considers economics and trade as a major element for the relation between 
two countries. In my case study, Kazakhstan and China have interests in trading crude oil because is 
a win-win situation for both of them, and in this way they have established strong political and 
economic links. But all the activities in the Kazakh oil sector by Chinese companies clearly have the 
goal to make them at least as important as Kazakh firms changing the perspective of the Kazakh side. 
This element -the relationship between the agents- is the leit motive of all the definitions analyzed 
above: the interaction between two -or more in the case of the systemic frameworks- agents is the 
pillar of the concept.  
The second element is the control. The term “control” means that the actor that possesses the 
natural resource, still has a good margin for the management of the resource. My point is that the term 
control is different from the idea of power as “power over”. If I considered power from this 
perspective, the relationship would be one in which the natural resources would pass from one 
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ownership to another. But in the oil sector, this is basically impossible: if a natural resource passes 
from a  state to another, that would be only the consequence of a conflict of a major political event 
like an international treaty or a war. The sovereignty of a state is the starting point of any extraction 
contract. In my case “control over” is more similar to the perspective of “power to”. 
If power as “dominance” is to be considered just like power as “ownership”, power as control 
is on a lower level with respect to it. In the former case, the state that owns the resource can do 
whatever it wants with the resources: it can decide how to distribute it and how to distribute the 
political and economic outcomes. In the latter case, the country that owns the resources can still decide 
where to allocate and where to distribute the resources and the outcomes of the production, but it has 
to consider the presence of the country that participates in the production with important assets, like 
shares of projects or exploration activities; the producing country in this case has not ceded the 
ownership of the resources. The reason why I define power as control and not influence is that the 
term influence does not imply that there is interdependence or asymmetry between the two states. 
Asymmetry and interdependence are present in the idea of “control over” because the two states meet 
in order to cover a lack and because they need each other.  
The third element is the idea of “vital economic resources” which are those resources a country 
relies on in its economic system. They can be both imported and exported resources. In the case of 
Kazakhstan, the crude oil is to be considered the vital economic resource because it represents more 
than half of the annual revenues coming from the export sector, a portion that grows if we add the 
revenues from the refined oil export. In the case of China, crude oil is also a vital economic resource 
because it represents the second most imported good in terms of annual revenues. My consideration 
for economic resources is linked to the importance of the economic resources in shaping the power 
relations between countries. interdependence, asymmetry, and control are linked to the assumption 
that the main instruments of power are not only the military capabilities, geography, or population, 
but also the natural resources, the distribution of them, and trade.  
60 
 
The Multi-vector Policy 
 The third variable is the “multi-vector policy”, a concept that has been widely analyzed and 
applied to the Central Asia states since their independence. This concept regards the activities in the 
foreign policy of countries surrounded by stronger power through diversified channels to have good 
relations with countries belonging to different frameworks. It is not surprising that the Central Asian 
countries represent a good case study for the analysis of this concept. Central Asian states are located 
in a zone that is a bridge between Europe and Asia and superpowers like China and Russia are strongly 
interested in these bordering countries. The first author who was tried to define this concept was 
Brzezinski, who in his book ‘The Premature Partnership’ called the diversification of the foreign 
policy “geopolitical pluralism”.286 The problem with Brzezinski is that in every book the main topic 
is the fight between empires, maybe as a consequence of the years spent as National Security Advisor 
during the Jimmy Carter presidency (1977-1980). So this concept is mainly focused on how to prevent 
the rebuilding of the Russian Empire in Central Asia.287 This concept is empire-centered and does not 
take into account the Central Asian state’s perspective.  
 The turning point in the evolution of this concept was the Crimean Crisis in 2014 which 
showed hoe Nur-Sultan could not be politically connected to only one superpower because the 
consequences could have been negative for the economy and the political stability of the ruling elite. 
It became clear that Kazakhstan needed to apply a stronger diversified approach to foreign policy. 
Hanks defined multi-vector policy as a policy based on pragmatism and non-ideological foundations 
that does not take into account the internal regimes of the countries partner.288 For the author, this 
was the only foreign policy that followed by Nazarbayev during his presidency,289 while the last 
literature has argued that the Kazakh foreign policy during the first 30 years of independence was 
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moved by the Eurasian integration.290 The difference between these two analyses is that the former 
approach is wider than the latter because it considers as partners also countries outside the post-Soviet 
and Asian frameworks. Some other authors have discussed this concept in the Eurasian framework in 
a sort of New Great Game, like Omelicheva and Du who defined multi-vector policy a pragmatic 
strategy to overcome the status of minor power that rejects permanent alliances in order to increase 
the bargaining power.291 All these definitions share some aspects but they never give a deep 
explanation of the concept and their possible consequences: they never explain which form this policy 
take.  
 The most complete definition of multi-vector policy was given by Contessi. Contessi does not 
move away from the Central Asian context for the conceptualization, but he does consider both the 
point of view of the single states and the point of view of the entire system. He also uses the terms 
multi-vector ‘policy’ and multi-vector ‘diplomacy’ interchangeably. That emphasizes how the 
concept, even if shaped on the experience of Central Asian politics, can be applied also in other 
international political frameworks. Contessi presents some variants of multi-vector policy concept a 
as synthesis of the type of policy and the level it works -state level or system level.292 The types are: 
mitigate exclusive dependence; marshal alternative sources of legitimation; mitigate one power’s 
ability to dictate the condition of exports; socio-economic development.293 These types combined 
with the levels create the 8 variants: great power overlay; autonomy and sovereignty; international 
norms; regime survival; great power dependence; natural resources export development; externally 
sponsored corridors; global economic and infrastructure integration. This taxonomy passes the usual 
characters that are considered in the conceptualization: the geopolitical position of a country and 
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economic development. These are usually considered to be more linked to a classical Realist vision 
of international relations in which countries have only two options: fighting the superpowers or 
bandwagoning. With this new approach of the concept, the countries that apply this policy have more 
options and more freedom to choose the steps at every new event. In particular for my case study, the 




















Over the period from 2014 and 2018, Kazakhstan was among the top 16 exporting countries 
in the world for the value of exportation in the crude oil sector. Its percentage on the world total 
export oscillated between 3.0% of 2016 and 3.9% of 2018.294 In this period, the annual revenue 
coming from the export of crude oil fluctuated from the 56,627 million dollars in 2014,295 to the 
37,803 million in 2018.296 This variation is important because in these 5 years the export of crude oil 
represented more than half of the total export of Kazakhstan, allowing the country to maintain a 
positive trade balance all over this period. In 2014, crude oil represented about 67.49% of the total 
export value.297 Over the period I analyze, this percentage represents the highest value of oil export 
for Kazakhstan, a level not reached in the following years. In 2015 the value of the export dropped 
down by 10 points – to 58.26%-.298 That was the first of a two years-fall: also in 2016, the value of 
crude oil was 52.69% of the entire export. That year represented a negative peak for Kazakh oil export 
and the economy. The value of crude export for the years 2017 and 2018 went through a growth 
typical of economic phenomena after a sudden fall: the export of crude oil in 2016 bounced up to the 
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54.99% on the total and up to 62.01% in 2018.299 This growth allowed Kazakhstan to reached a good 
level of crude oil export, but not as good as in 2014.  
The oscillation in the percentage in the value of the export is reflected in the actual quantity 
of oil exported. In 2014, Nur-Sultan exported 68 million tons of crude,300 this quantity decreased in 
2015 and 2016 -respectively down to 63 million tons and 62 million tons.301 The amount of crude 
exported grew in 2017 and again in 2018: the quantity of crude oil exported grew up to 68 million 
tons during the first year and 69 million tons in the latter.302 If we analyze these changes in percentage 
we notice that in 2018 the total revenues were still 70,48% of the revenues of 2014, despite an annual 
growth of  42,17%.303 So, the country, and its economy, was still recovering from the two-years crisis. 
Despite this volatility in the export of oil, Kazakhstan always remained a country with an extremely 
high level of revenues coming from the oil sector -more than 50% of the good on the total export. 
Only in 2016, the reduction was so critical from the average that it might have reduced the security 
of supply from the extremely high level to the high level -between 35% and 50% on the total export-
.  
In the same period, crude oil represented the second good most imported by China. In 2014 it 
was ranked first, but it dropped after China increased the import of electronic circuits.304 Even in the 
case of China, there is a drop in the value of crude oil imported in 2015 and in 2016, just like in the 
value of revenues coming from the export of oil for Kazakhstan. In 2014, the value of the import of 
oil was 228,288 million dollars and the percentage was 11.66% of the total import sector.305 The value 
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decreased in 2015 down to 134,342 million dollars306 to 116,660 million dollars in 2016307 counting 
respectively 8.00% and the 7.35% of the total value of the import. The value increased in 2017 and 
2018 when crude oil counted 8.88% and 11.02% of the total import, while the total amount was 
162,820 million dollars in the first year and 239,222 million dollars in the second.308 What we notice 
here is that there is a parallelism between Kazakhstan and China: both the countries experienced a 
drop in the value of their oil flows in the years 2015 and 2016. This is due to the fluctuation of crude 
oil prices. In those years, the oil price touched the lowest points of the decade, reaching 46.79 d/bs in 
January 2015 and 27.79 d/bs in January 2016 on the Brent index.309 In 2014 the price per unit of crude 
oil -expresses in kgs- paid by China was 0.7 dollars per unit, the following year was 0.4 dollars.310 
The prices were low also in 2016 -0.3 dollars- and 2017 -0.4 dollars-.311 In 2018 the price grew a bit 
until reaching 0.5 dollars per unit. China took advantage of this situation: the quantity of oil imported 
in the years between 2015 and 2018 had an annual growth of 10.66% and if we take into account the 
general growth, the quantity exported in 2018 was 49.79% higher of the quantity of 2014. All these 
quantities were imported with a reduction of expenditure. So China took advantage of this situation, 
which was so favorable that the expenditures in 2018 grew by 4.79% if compared to 2014, but the 
quantity imported increased by 49.79. We can assume that in the years analyzed China enjoy the 
crisis of the oil price while Kazakhstan did not because saw a huge portion of its export and economy 
undermined by the strong fluctuation.  
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In analyzing we actual flows of export of Kazakhstan and import of China and the effects of 
their relation, we must remember the bilateral asymmetry in the data provided to the UN, that is a 
statistical gap between the data provided by Kazakh and Chinese governments regarding the flow in 
their countries. I decided to maintain this gap in the calculations of import and export of the countries 
in order to reflect their points of view and to get one of the main points of the theoretical background: 
that in an asymmetric relationship, the relationship itself is shaped by the respect of the points of view 
of each state.  
 
The Kazakh export in the years 2014-2018312 
In 2014, the top destinations of the Kazakh oil export were: Italy; the Netherlands; China; 
France; Switzerland; Romania; Austria; Spain; Greece; Israel; Turkey and India, that together 
accounted the 90% of the total export. At that time the China was third destination for Kazakhstan: 
the quantity of crude oil reaching Beijing was 6.269 million tons, worth 4,879 million dollars and 
9.10% on the total export.313 The main partner was Italy, that alone counted almost one-third of the 
total oil export. European countries were the main destinations of the export followed by Asian 
countries.  
The first sign of change in this picture started in 2015. In that year, there was a change in the 
top three destinations. Italy was still the first destination of the export -the quantity exported and the 
revenues still accounted one-third of the total- but the share of export destined to the Netherlands 
increased by two points -from 11.97% to 13.95%-. France became the third destination, accounting 
9% of the total. But the main variation concerned the Asian destination. The export to China fell as 
the country was passed by Switzerland. Kazakh export to China reduced by more than one million 
tons, from 6.269 million tons to 5.097 million. The revenues, also considering the fall of the oil price, 
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reduced passing from 4,879 million dollars to 2, million dollars, representing 7.6% of the total. One 
country that became more important for the Kazakh export was South Korea. In 2015 South Korea 
was the second Asian destination for the Kazakh oil and the ninth overall representing 2.5% of the 
total export. On an annual basis, the percentage of export to Seoul doubled because in 2014 it was 
only 1.4% of the total.314 The flow of crude oil from Kazakhstan to the East Asian country grew by 
60.4%. This growth is to be considered with the parallel reduction of the export to China and the 
reduction of the export to India, which in 2014 accounted 1.88% of the export and in 2015 only 
0.65%.  
In 2016, the export from Kazakhstan saw a strengthening of the flow to the European 
destinations with respect to the Asian ones. The export to Italy grew by 3 million tons and it accounted 
for more than 37% on the total.315 This trend is confirmed by the fact that the first top-five destinations 
were all European, and in two cases the importing country saw an annual increase. These countries 
are Switzerland and Spain. The former was the third top destination and the latter the fifth. In that 
period the export to China was still reducing. The flow to the bordering country accounted for only 
4.5%, a sensitive reduction from 7.6% of the previous years. The revenues were only 876 million 
dollars, 4,000 million less if compared to the flow in 2014. From that year on, China as Asian 
destination started becoming a secondary choice for Kazakhstan.  
The trend of the oil flow between Kazakhstan and China became clearer in 2017. South Korea 
became the first Asian destination in 2015, in which the country exported 2.375 million tons for 955 
million dollars, and despite a reduction in the export to Seoul in 2016, the level of revenues was 
higher than the level of 2014. The reduction of the importance of China as a destination is confirmed 
by the growth of flow to two other countries geopolitically rivals of China: India and Japan. The 
revenues coming from New Delhi accounted for the 2.33% of the total revenues of Kazakhstan that 
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year and the revenues coming from Tokyo accounted for the 1.28% and in both cases the increase 
experienced was the confirmation of a trend started in 2015. The only difference is that for India the 
process was gradual -the percentage of export in 2015 was 0.65 and in 2016 was 0.94-, while for 
Japan the export saw a slight reduction in 2016 -it was 1.09% from the 1.31% of 2015-. Furthermore, 
India entered among the top destinations of the Kazakh oil export, becoming the third Asian 
destination. Among the European destinations, that still were the most important for the Kazakh 
export, the revenues from Spain increased, reaching the highest level in the years analyzed -5.19%- 
and making the country the fifth destination right after Switzerland for 2017.  
In 2018 there was the definitive dip of the oil export to China, despite the reinforcement of 
the Asian destinations against the European destinations. The first Asian destination for the oil export 
was South Korea, second Japan, and then China and India. South Korea represented 7.45% of the 
total export of Kazakhstan and it was overall the fifth destination.316 Japan and India represented 
together almost 5% of the total export. The portion of China on the total export shrank down to 
2.19%.317 Compared with the crude oil export to China in 2014, there had been a reduction of almost 
7 points in terms of revenues. On the quantity side, in 2018 were exported 5 million tons less than in 
2014. The revenues coming from Japan and India were respectively 2.44% and 1.96% of the total. 
The diversification of the destinations was a feature also shared in the export to Europe. Alongside 
with the export to Western European countries already mentioned, that were still representing the top 
destinations of the flow, Kazakhstan started to export also to new Eastern European partners like, 
Poland and Lithuania that represented respectively 1.81% and 1.63% of the total. Curiously, in 
Europe there was a case similar to the Chinese one: Romania. In 2014 it was among the top European 
destination with 5.71% of the Kazakh export. This portion reduced and in 2018 it was 3.87%, being 
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passed by other European countries already mentioned -Spain and Switzerland- and in Asia by South 
Korea.  
 
The Chines import in the years 2014-2018318 
In 2014, the 90% of the crude oil import to China were from the following countries: Saudi 
Arabia; Angola; Russia; Oman; Iran; Iraq; United Arab Emirates (UAE); Venezuela; Kuwait 
Colombia; Congo; Brazil; South Sudan and Kazakhstan.319 Thanks to the import from these 14 states, 
China in that year had a high level of security demand because it had a high differentiated import if 
compared to the average number of suppliers for importing countries – either 9 or 10 countries 
usually-. In that year, Beijing could account for the oil imported from four different continents: 
Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. That made the demand of China safe from political or 
economic events that might block the flow of crude oil from one of the contexts. Among these states, 
the portion from Kazakhstan was 5.686 million tons out of 308.374 million tons, representing 1.8% 
of the total import and ranking Nur-Sultan after Congo, Brazil, and South Sudan.320 Kazakhstan and 
Russia were the only two bordering countries that were exporting oil to China, but the latter was on 
the top three. I want to emphasize an aspect the gives us the sense of the differentiation of the Chinese 
oil import: the top three importing countries belong to three different geopolitical and international 
contexts: Middle East -Saudi Arabia-, Atlantic Africa -Angola-, and Eurasian macro-continent -
Russia-.  
In 2015 the situation remained the same. The 14 countries listed above still represented 90% 
of the total oil imported for China, even if there were some changes in the ranking. Russia passed 
Angola as second most important importer for China, even if the African country remained in the top 
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three. One country that saw its portion -and importance- increased was Brazil, which reinforced its 
role as second South American supplier of China by doubling the percentage on the total: in 2014 
China imported 2.3% of its oil from Brazil while in 2015 was 4.2%. In terms of tons, in 2014 the 
amount was 7.024 million tons and in 2015 was 13.918 million tons.321 Since 2015, Brazil has been 
the first South American partner -passing an OPEC country that traditionally had a strong partnership 
with China: Venezuela322- in the import of oil because in the following years the portion continued 
to increase to 6.9% of the total on the Chinese import in 2018. Kazakhstan in 2015 saw its portion 
restricted: the portion coming from Kazakhstan restricted by 0.4% down to 1.5% reducing the relative 
importance of Nur-Sultan in the choices of Beijing.  
In 2016, there were some important changes in the framework of the Chinese import. The 
countries that gained more importance in this ranking were the United Kingdom and Vietnam. This 
change is paramount for Chinese import. It means that Europe increased its weight because the UK 
was the second European importer for Beijing after Russia, the portion of the UK in the amount 
imported that year represented 1.3% of the total. This portion was still distant from the amount of 
crude oil that China imported from Russia -that in 2016 was the first partner of China in term of oil 
import, passing Saudi Arabia- but gives us the idea of how the strategies followed by the Chinese 
government did not exclude any country or were just reserved to second-category economic powers. 
The second important aspect is that the presence of Vietnam among the top importing countries means 
new attention to the South East Asian context. Vietnam exported in 2016 almost the same quantity of 
oil as the UK: 4.954 million tons The European country and 4.265 the South-Eastern country.323 As 
the importance of the UK and Vietnam increased, the quantity of oil coming from Kazakhstan 
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decreased. In 2016 China imported just 2.502 million tons from Kazakhstan, which counted for 0.85% 
of the total.   
In 2017, the Chines import showed the consolidation of two important aspects: the quote of 
import from South East Asia and the presence of the United States as a major exporter for the Chinese 
market. As a matter of fact, Malaysia became on the most important exporters by sending to China 
6.587 million tons of oil crude, which represented 1.5% of the total.324 These numbers may appear 
insignificant but are actually crucial if compared with the numbers of the oil imported from 
Kazakhstan. The flow from the Central Asian country reduced further, and in that year it represented 
only 0.6% on the total crude imported by China. Kazakhstan has turned into a secondary, if not 
tertiary, option for the Chinese oil needs, despite its closeness. On the contrary, the USA grew in 
importance because the import of oil to China had begun to increase sensitively until reaching almost 
2% on the total.325 The main point is that in 2014 the import of oil from the USA was basically 
nonexistent, and it had exponential growth in those years. In 2017, China imported 7.580 million tons 
from the US, a significant growth if compared with the 485,433 tons that were imported in 2016.326  
The role if the US in the crude Chinese import strengthened the following year. In 2018 the 
import almost doubled to more than 12.281 million tons, and as a consequence the import reached 
2.6% of the total import for 2018. In this way, the US became the first “western” source of crude oil 
for China. The import from Kazakhstan in that year reduced down to 0.5% of the total and the quantity 
of oil imported was 2.287 million tons.327 If we compared the quantity exported in that year with the 
quantity imported in 2014 you notice a reduction of the 60%, as a consequence the portion that 
Kazakhstan represented in the Chinese oil import in 2014, has been taken by other countries of 
different continents, like UK, USA, Brazil and lately Malaysia, which have represented the novelty 
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in an import dominated by Russia, Middle East countries and African countries. For these reasons, 
the level of diversification of China in its crude import has always been high in the last six years.  
 
Kazakhstan and China, never been further? 
What we see in the comparison between the import to China and the Kazakh export of oil in 
the period 2014-2018 is that the flow between the two countries reduced sensitively. This reduction 
sustains my hypothesis -an importing country will meet resistance from the exporting country and 
will not be able to increase its power over it. By power, I meant a situation in which an importing 
country imposes itself as the main destination of a natural resource -in my case oil- produced in a 
different country which bases its economy over the production and the export of the natural resource. 
By giving a numerical measure, I would say that when a country exports 40% of its crude oil to only 
one destination, the importing country is a condition of power with respect to the exporter. This 
situation implies that the relationship is oriented toward a stronger position of the importer over the 
exporter, because for the supplier country the relationship represents the only source of revenues for 
the trade balance and in case of sudden crisis in the importing country the national economy of the 
supplier would collapse. In this case, we can talk about power as “ownership” because the importer 
country is in a situation in which the resource is in its availability even if nominally belonging to the 
exporter. When the exporter country sends a portion between 20% and 40% to just one importer, the 
level of power can be defined as “control”, because e a sudden reduction of demand by the importer 
could create a crisis in the trade balance of the exporter and reduces the revenues. When the level of 
export to one country is lower than the 20%, the importer has “influence” over the flow of the supplier, 
but the supplier can still count on the revenues from other destinations without having the trade 




Table n.2: Power Indicators of the importing country 
Level of 
Power 
Percentage of oil produced 
in one country exported 
abroad to one destination 
Ownership > 40% 
 
Control 20% − 40% 
 
Influence < 20% 
 
In the case of the relationship between Kazakhstan and China, the latter started from a position 
of influence in the Kazakh export and we saw that the investment made by the Chinese oil companies 
was aiming at having a bigger role in the entire production chain. We also saw that the Kazakh 
government had a reaction and it started moving in the direction of buying back shares of the national 
oil companies and how the trade flow reduced between 2014 and 2018. To understand how crucial 
the oil sector for the Kazakh economy is, we must consider the GDP composition of the period we 
are analyzing.328 Between 2014 and 2018 the export of oil was the main contributor to the trade 
balance of Kazakhstan,329 and the trade balance suffered from the fall of the oil price in 2016 and 
2017. The problem is that in the same period the voice “trade” in the Kazakh GDP counted on average 
the 16.9% of the total, resulting the second biggest sector after industry -which is composed for more 
than half by the extraction of minerals and oil-.330 In other words, the extraction of oil and its trade 
are at the basis of the Kazakh economy, which is used by the government as a pillar of its political 
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stability. So, in case China had increased the import from Kazakhstan, and in the other way around 
Kazakhstan had increased the export to China, in combination with the action of the Chinese NOCs 
in the Kazakh oil sector, Beijing would have had the chance to increase the power over the main 
sectors of the Kazakh GDP and national economy. The intervening variable that stops the causal 
relation between energy security and power is the multi-vector policy. Both China and Kazakhstan 
kept a high level of energy security -from the side of supplying for Nur-Sultan and from the side of 
diversification for Beijing- between 2014 and 2018. At the same time Nur-Sultan in that period 
exported to other countries in Asia -South Korea, India, and Japan- and increased the export to 
Europe, making France an important partner, growing the importance of other countries -like 
Switzerland- and maintaining as first destination Italy as a reaction of the possible increase of power 
over the main economic source of the country from the bordering and powerful country. The 
European destinations represent a good way to guarantee a safe source of revenues for the Kazakh 
economy without losing control of it, as it would have been if China had increased its import. The 
only country that can represent a menace for Kazakhstan is Italy, but the difference between the Italian 
and the Chinese activity in Kazakhstan is that ENI, the Italian NOC, does not have a strategy that 
implies the buying of Kazakh NOCs’ shares, but the collaboration with the Kazakh Government.331 
In the five years analyzed China maintained a stable flow with its three main suppliers -Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, and Angola- and increased its diversification by importing from new African countries -like 
Congo-, from South American countries -Brazil- or South Eastern Asia -Vietnam and Malaysia-. 
These zones are those that are going to be affected by the BRI according to the Chinese projects. But 
to explain the change in the suppliers of oil just like a strategic application of the BRI is reductive. 
Finally, what matters along with the reduction of percentage on the total import is the actual reduction 
of the quantity of oil imported. If China would have kept unchanged its import from Kazakhstan, it 
 
331 Agi, ‘Eni ottiene i diritti di esplorazione e produzione nell'area di Abay, in Kazakhstan’,  
https://www.agi.it/economia/energia/eni_esplorazione_produzione_offshore_abay_kazakhstan-5778841/news/2019-07-
05/, consulted on 07/16/2020 
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would have meant that its role for the Central Asian state was still a prominent one among the 
destinations of Kazakh crude oil. The reduction of kgs exported between 2014 and 2018 is the proof 
that the Kazakh implementation of the multi-vector policy wanted to give preference to new 
destinations and put apart China, that as a consequence started to import from new countries 
strategically more important.  
These data also prove the theory of Womack right. To mention Womack again, in his theory 
the difference of perspectives of the two countries shapes the relationship in a way that actor A and 
actor B reinforce each other and their interests. In this situation, data show that the reduction of export 
to China was due to a will of Kazakhstan to supply other countries that do not represent a threat for 
the national economy because distant from the supplier -and as consequence less prone to intervene 
politically- and to make the action in its oil sector free from the interference of such important 
bordering country.332 In this way, Nur-Sultan can achieve one of the pillars of Womack’s theory: the 
maintenance of its autonomy by maintaining a high level of energy security as shown in table n.3. 
The problem in the relationship with China is that Beijing threatened this autonomy showing a lack 
of respect, that according to Womack is essential in an asymmetric relationship. Kazakhstan’s 
reaction to the interference of China in the oil sector has made possible to maintain the autonomy, 
because the actions of the Chinese oil companies and the growth of the Chinese portion of import 
from Kazakhstan created an overcoming presence in the sector and created a problem for the first 
source of income for the Central Asian national economy.333  
Womack defines the interactions of two countries as ‘negotiated’, and from this term, he 
describes the relationship considering two aspects: whether both the countries are equally exposed in 
the relationship, and whether they have convergent interests. In the case of Kazakhstan and China, 
the latter is to be considered the country A and the one with more capabilities -meant as the resource 
 
332 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 46 
333 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 44 
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of a country to sustain its interests abroad-334 and it is less exposed to the relationship. As a matter of 
fact China’s “going out” strategy allows the country to reach different producer countries in different 
political frameworks. In this China has met the common Kazakhstan’s interests, because both of them 
wanted to establish a good flow of crude oil between the two economies. The main problem is that 
Kazakhstan is country B in the relationship and it has more at stake, because in case a foreign country 
increases the control over the resource and become the external owner, it will lose the most important 
part of its export sector and consequently of the  GDP -the oil revenues - making the national economy 
shrink. I classified above three levels of power: ownership, control, and influence.  
The interactions between countries categorized by Womack, can be compared with the 
measurement of power. Ownership corresponds to domination -set between disjunctive interests and 
one side exposure-; control to patron-client interaction -set between one side exposure and convergent 
interests-; strategic partnership to influence -between convergent interests and equal exposure-; and 
strategic to rivalry -between equal exposure and disjunctive interests- with the lack of power 
relations.335 The two countries started from a situation in which the interaction was characterized by 
a strategic partner relationship in which but both have convergent interests -Kazakhstan to sell crude 
oil, China to have a source of crude oil next to its border, in this way they could keep their energy 
security indicators high - and ended up toward a situation in which the interaction moved toward a 
situation of strategic rivalry, characterized by disjunctive interests336 because the influence of the 
stronger side diminished until almost disappear and the weakest side was able to take its own 
decisions about the resources.  
As I mentioned, the reduction of power -shown by the reduction of percentage exported to 
China in the power indicator (table n.4)- and the impossibility for an importer country to increase it 
over one of its suppliers was due to the change of relationship, represented in my case study by the 
 
334 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 43  
335 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 53 
336 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 53-54.  
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multi-vector policies implemented by Nur-Sultan. According to Womack the change of structure in 
the relationship is due to the changes in the elements of the asymmetric relationship: capabilities, 
identity, diplomacy, and context.337 We already spoke about capabilities. Identity is defined by the 
author as “the country’s notion of self as presumed by the state’s activity” and it is formed by territory 
people and ideology.338 One change in one of these ‘basic’ components causes the change of the 
identity in the state. Diplomacy is the “interaction of the two governments”339 and is the element that 
takes into account the external and internal political events in its shaping. The last element, context, 
is the “shared international environment of the bilateral relationship”.340 But there is an important 
aspect that must be considered in the bilateral relationship: if the relationship has higher or lower 
frames that can make change the international position of the country. So in my case study, China is 
country A and Kazakhstan is country B, but if we enlarge the international environment to other 
countries like Kyrgyzstan, in the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the latter 
would be country B because smaller and with less capabilities. The second factor constituting the 
context is time, because the relationship between two countries changes over time and the position 
can reverse.  
In my case study, there are two elements that more than the others relate to the intervening 
variable: capability and diplomacy. The change in capabilities means a possible control of China over 
the main economic resource of Kazakhstan, making one part of the GDP coming straight from a 
country with bigger political instruments and different goals and it would have tied the variations of 
trade balance and GDP to the decisions taken in a foreign country. Multi-vector policy is a variable 
that includes diplomacy first of all, and that is why the changes in this element of the bilateral 
relationship are to be connected with the variable. As we saw, this variable is a political guideline 
used to pursued to emphasize the autonomy and independence of countries in foreign policy and that 
 
337 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 61 
338 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 63  
339 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 64 
340 Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p. 65 
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is why it has found in the Central Asian context the best actuation. Related to Womack, multi-vector 
policy is the way to reinforce the autonomy of country B against country A, which is brought by it to 
the respect toward country B. So, it is the foreign policy part of the element that characterized the 
intervening variable. If I had taken into account the other part of the element, the internal political 
issues, I would have considered identity -and in particular the single identities if all the three clans of 
the Kazakh population- as the prominent element in the change of the relationship. The last element 
listed by Womack, context, is also to be not considered as an element of change in the relationship, 
for a simple reason: Kazakhstan does not have inherent features to become as strong as China in the 
bilateral relationship in the future, and it does not have a past historical situation in which the positions 
of the two countries were reversed to aspire to.  
 
















2014 67.49% Extremely 
High 
 14 High 
2015 58.26% Extremely 
High 
 14 High 
2016 52.69% Extremely 
High 
 15 High 
2017 54.99% Extremely 
High 
 16 High 
2018 62.01% Extremely 
High 









Table N.4: China’s levels of power over Kazakhstan  









































In this dissertation I have tried to draw the pattern of the relations between Kazakhstan and 
China in the oil sector. I have analyzed the concepts of energy security, power, and multi-vector 
policy, giving for each one of them a complete analysis of how they have evolved and which aspect 
were useful for my analysis; then from these concepts I have tried to analyze if an importing country 
can increase its power over the exporter country. In my analysis the theoretical background was the 
Asymmetry Theory of Brantly Womack -also defined by the author himself “dialectical realism”- 
which emphasizes how the difference in the distribution of military, political, and economic 
capabilities shape the relationship between two geographically close countries, with one being bigger 
than the other. My case study proved this hypothesis – that despite economic asymmetry, an importing 
country will meet resistance from a smaller exporting country and will not be able to increase its 
power over it - to be right and proves the Womack theory to be right too. The relations between 
Kazakhstan and China -two bordering countries those relationship is characterized by the economic 
power of China and the production of crude oil by the Central Asian country- in the oil sector -a 
strategic sector for both the countries in terms of export and import- were born in the 1990s and 
developed in the two following decades until reaching a stable flow in the 2010s, after that Chinese 
investment in the country became a feature for the development of the sector. But starting from 2014, 
the data show that the trend has changed until a sensitive reduction of the flow in 2018 making 
Kazakhstan one of the last suppliers to China and China one of the last buyers of oil from the Central 
Asia state. I explained this change in the relationship due to the fact that multi-vector policy, a kind 
of policy traditionally applied by Nur-Sultan in its foreign policy, intervened in the relation of power 
as consequence of energy security.  
The reduction of the flow of crude oil between is an important setback in the relationship 
between the two countries, that are forced to have economic and political relations because of the 
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closeness. The problem is that the issues characterizing this relation are many and politically 
explosive. Foreign issues like the treatment of  the Uighur minority in the Xinjiang autonomous 
region, the development of the BRI, and the Chinese threaten to the Russian influence in the region, 
along with internal factor like the reactions of the Kazakh population to the growing role of Chinese 
companies in all the local economies; the struggle for power inside the Kazakhs Government, and the 
effect of COVID-19 are likely to be the basis of the choice of the approach that Nur-Sultan will have 
with Beijing in the next years. All these factors should be analyzed in order to have a wider and more 
comprehensive picture of the relations between the two countries. While China does not need to figure 
all these problems out in the short term to maintain a satisfactory relation with Kazakhstan, Nur-
Sultan will need to solve some of them -especially those internal- in order to maintain a stable position 
with Beijing and no to became a prey of both the economic and political activities of China and the 


















Top destinations of Kazakh crude oil export 2014-2018 according their value in million dollars. These 
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Value of the export to Asian destinations in million $ 
China South Korea India Japan
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Comparison between China and European destinations in million $
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Oil revenues and value of Kazakh export between 2014 and 2018 
in million $ 
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Percentage of the Oil Revenues on the total export years 2014-
2018




















2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Kazakh crude oil export trend 2014-2018
Annual Growth Total export in million tons
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Kazakhs crude oil revenues trend 2014-2018 in million $
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Appendix n. 2 
The graphs in this section concern the quantity of Chinese import of crude oil -in million tons- in the 
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China import from secondary Asian supplier form 2014 to 
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Comparison between Kazakhstan and South American 
suppliers in the Chinese import in million tons (2014-2018)
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Comparison between the import from Kazakhstan, USA, 
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Chinese crude oil import trend 2014-2018
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Chinese crude oil expense trend 2014-2018 in million $
Annual variation Total expense
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